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Abstract 
We investigate whether legislation of equal inheritance rights for women modifies 
the historic preference for sons in India, and find that it exacerbates it. Children 
born after the reform in families with a firstborn daughter are 3.8-4.3 percentage 
points less likely to be girls, indicating that the reform encouraged female foeticide. 
We also find that the reform increased excess female infant mortality and son-biased 
fertility stopping. This suggests that the inheritance reform raised the costs of having 
daughters, consistent with which we document an increase in stated son preference 
in fertility post-reform. We conclude that this is a case where legal reform was 
frustrated by persistence of cultural norms. We provide some suggestive evidence of 
slowly changing patrilocality norms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Two centuries ago, women in Europe and America were considered the property of men 
(fathers or husbands), having no intrinsic rights of their own. Women’s rights have been 
established by a long, slow process (described for instance in Doepke et al. 2012), in which 
legislation of their property rights was an important milestone. However, daughters still 
continue to have weaker property inheritance rights than sons in many developing 
countries today. In all of the Middle East and North Africa, in 50 percent of South Asian 
countries, 34 percent of sub-Saharan African countries, and 25 percent of East Asian and 
Pacific countries, inheritance laws either disfavour or altogether exclude women (World 
Bank 2011). Twenty-one of the 63 countries studied by Htun and Weldon (2011) have 
unequal property inheritance rights for men and women (WDR 2012). 
This is potentially a major factor in compromising the position of women. 
Property, and in particular land, is a critical determinant of economic and social status 
(Agarwal, 1994). Property rights are associated with increased investment, productivity, 
access to credit and labour market opportunities (Besley 1995; Banerjee et al. 2002; Field 
2007; Besley and Ghatak 2009; Ghatak and Roy 2007). Land markets in developing 
countries are scarce and land is typically acquired through inheritance. As a result, even 
amongst the landowning classes, women in developing countries continue to be asset-poor, 
and unequal inheritance rights tend to perpetuate the condition in which women find 
themselves reliant upon men, having limited earning capacity and limited options outside 
marriage (Field 2007; Goldstein and Udry 2008; Chung and Dasgupta 2007). The 
equalization of inheritance rights may therefore be expected to be a powerful instrument 
for the empowerment of women. This has potential impacts on women’s labour supply 
(Joulfaian 2006), fertility (Ashraf et al. 2014), health (Jayaraman et al. 2013; Calvi et al. 2017) 
and mortality (Milazzo 2014). In addition, several studies show that the financial 
empowerment of women directly benefits children because women tend to invest more in 
children (e.g. Lundberg et al., 1997; Duflo and Udry 2004; Bobonis 2009; Baranov et al. 
2017). There is also some evidence that women invest relatively more in girls, redressing 
gender inequality in the next generation (Thomas 1990, 1994; Dahl and Moretti 2008; 
Baranov et al. 2017).    
However, causal evidence that property rights empower women is limited, and the 
available evidence is somewhat mixed. In the context of India, inheritance rights for 
women were equalized with the rights of men by five states that enacted legislative reforms 
between 1976 and 1994, with federal legislation imposing equal rights for all states in 2005. 
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A handful of studies have exploited the staggered implementation of these reforms to 
examine impacts on different aspects of women’s status in India. One study documents 
increased suicide rates among both men and women aged 15–44, with a significantly larger 
increase among men (Anderson and Genicot 2015). The authors rationalize this in terms of 
increased intra-household conflict, showing also an increase in domestic violence.  
Focusing on girls of school-going age, rather than on women who were of marriageable 
age or married at the time of the reform, Roy (2015) and Deininger et al. (2013) show that 
the reform was associated with increased educational investment in girls relative to boys. 
These results suggest that negotiating sharp changes in women’s economic rights may 
increase marital conflict for some, while expanding marital prospects for others.1  
In this paper, we ask a very different question. We investigate not whether equal 
property rights legislation empowers women within marriage or on the marriage market, 
but whether it modifies the historic tendency for Indian parents to prefer to have sons. 
There is hardly a more compelling statement of gender inequality in India than its 
unnaturally male-biased population sex ratio, an important driver of which is the desire to 
have sons. To what extent is this historic desire for sons driven by their stronger economic 
position and, in particular, their greater command over ancestral property? Might granting 
equal inheritance rights to daughters mellow the preference for having sons? Plausible 
mechanisms are that it would allow daughters to offer the old-age security that sons have 
traditionally provided to parents (Chung and Dasgupta 2007), or that it would diminish 
dowry, the burden of which raises the cost of having daughters (Anderson 2003, Bhalotra 
et al. 2016). These potential mechanisms are linked. Although dowry is now often 
appropriated by the groom or his parents, historically it was a pre-mortem bequest to 
daughters given at the time of marriage, while post-mortem bequests (typically of family 
property) went to sons (Goody 1973). This custom, evident in large parts of Europe and 
Asia, was premised upon married daughters leaving the parental home, in contrast to 
married sons who tended to co-reside with parents. Botticini and Siow (2003) model the 
institution of dowry jointly with patrilineal inheritance as emerging from parents’ attempt 
to solve a free riding problem between siblings to create incentives for sons to provide 
                                               
1 The increase in male relative to female suicides reported in Anderson and Genicot (2015) 
illustrates the difficulty with defining women’s empowerment. It suggests that a challenge to the 
economic power of men generates greater distress or damage among men, but to the extent that 
the suicides are of married men, they create the perilous state of widowhood for women (Chen and 
Dreze 1992). However, their data are for all suicides among 15-44 year olds at the state-year level 
and not available by marital status. This may therefore represent suicides of unmarried men at the 
bottom of the socioeconomic distribution who find it harder to match on the marriage market after 
the inheritance reform. 
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effort. Therefore, legislation that compels parents to share post-mortem bequests equally 
with daughters may lead to erosion of dowry, and it may modify the convention of women 
marrying into households some distance away from their natal homes, while sons co-reside 
with or live close to parents (and family property).2 Thus, to the extent that dowry and co-
residence with sons determine the preference for having sons, we may expect gender 
equality in property rights to lower son preference.  
In this paper, we investigate this issue by modelling the sex ratio at birth as a 
function of whether the inheritance reform in the state of birth had been passed before the 
year of birth. To identify causal effects of equal inheritance rights for women, we leverage 
the staggered implementation of the inheritance reform across the Indian states, which 
created state and cohort-level variation in reform exposure, similar, for instance, to Miller 
(2008). We buttress this double difference using two further sources of variation that 
determine the degree of exposure to the reform. First, we interact the inheritance reform 
indicator with a cohort-varying indicator for availability of ultrasound technology. Previous 
work shows ultrasound availability generated a trend break in the sex ratio at birth 
(Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). We exploit the fact that prior to the introduction of 
ultrasound technology that made prenatal detection of the sex of the foetus feasible, no 
significant manipulation of the sex ratio at birth is discernible in aggregate statistics 
(Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). So, for the sex ratio at birth to have responded to the 
reform, the indicator for ultrasound access will need to have switched on.  This aids 
identification because any omitted variables that drive a spurious relationship between the 
outcome variables and inheritance reform would have to have exhibited a discontinuous 
change that not only lines up with the particular state and year variation in reform (i.e. in 
the state of Kerala in 1976, in Andhra Pradesh in 1986 and so on) but, in addition, the 
omitted variables would have to have jumped in line with the date of introduction of 
ultrasound scans as well. Moreover, crossing the reform and ultrasound indicators helps us 
attribute any observed effects to parental manipulation of the sex ratio.  
The final source of variation deployed towards identification is the sex of the 
firstborn child. Previous work shows that this is a) quasi-random and b) that it predicts 
                                               
2 Patrilineality includes passing on the main productive assets through the male line, while women 
may be given some movable goods in the form of dowry or inheritance. This constrains women's 
ability to sustain their economic level of welfare without being attached to a man. Patrilocality 
involves a couple residing at the man's home, which goes hand in hand with inheritance, especially 
in peasant societies where land is the main productive asset that is inherited. Indeed, Agarwal 
(personal communication with Bhalotra) posits that persistence in kinship systems and marriage practices 
(among which the distance of post-marital residence from the natal home is particularly significant) 
“may help to explain the failure to realise in practice the significantly greater inheritance rights in 
landed property which South Asian women now enjoy as a result of recent legislative changes.” 
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sex-selective abortion in favour of male children: parents who, by the random hand of 
nature, are assigned a son at first birth are significantly less likely to engage in female 
foeticide for subsequent conceptions (see Almond et al. forthcoming, Almond and Edlund 
2008, Abrevaya 2009, Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010, Anukriti et al. 2016).3 We also show that 
families with firstborn sons and families with firstborn daughters are balanced on all 
relevant observable characteristics.   
To summarize, the treated group is defined as a cohort born post-reform and post-
ultrasound in a family with a firstborn daughter. The control group includes families with 
firstborn sons and children born pre-reform or pre-ultrasound. We corroborate our 
findings of changes in sex-selective abortion behaviour using data on reported son 
preference (i.e. desired share of sons among births). We conclude with an attempt to 
investigate whether passage of the reform was associated with changes in patriarchal 
norms, in particular, whether daughters married closer to the natal home, and whether 
adult sons changed their propensity to co-reside with parents.  
We use the three available rounds of nationally representative individual level data 
from the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) pertaining to births between 1972 
and 2004. We find a significant decrease of 3.8-4.3 percentage points in the probability that a 
girl is born post-reform and post-ultrasound in households where the firstborn child is a 
girl rather than a boy. This magnitude of decline is outside the biologically normal range.4 
In Section 5.1, we put it in perspective, comparing with other studies and with rates of 
ultrasound scan use. 
Our finding that female foeticide increased in response to inheritance reform is 
robust to the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed effects. These mop up variation in state-
level pro-female legislation that may have coincided with inheritance reform, for instance 
the establishment of Women’s Commissions (discussed in Andersen and Genicot 2015). 
This is a relevant concern given that India has a federal system and a number of states 
have, at different times, implemented laws designed to limit the extent of sex-selective 
abortion (Sekhar 2012). State-year fixed effects also absorb the effects of economic 
influences on the desire for sons such as the increase in returns to education for girls 
relative to boys, as well as account for any differential state-level pre-trends in the 
outcome. Our results are also robust to controlling for mother’s age and mother fixed 
                                               
3 The premise that the sex of the first birth is random is also discussed and investigated in Bhalotra 
and Cochrane (2010) and Anukriti et al. (2016), using the same data as ours. 
4 For a discussion of the biologically normal range of the probability that a birth is a girl rather than 
a boy, and evidence of the size of deviations from this norm that were apparent immediately upon 
the introduction of ultrasound technology in India, see Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010). 
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effects, which absorb all mother-specific time-invariant variables including unobservables 
such as her preference for sons or her fertility preferences (as well as, of course, 
observables such as her education, caste and religion). The mother’s preferences may 
determine compliance and thus including mother fixed effects will adjust for any changes 
in the composition of women giving birth post-reform. In addition, our results are also 
robust to using an alternative dataset (REDS 2006). Additional robustness checks are 
discussed in Section 5.2.   
The most plausible interpretation of our finding is that in the presence of sticky 
social norms, awarding inheritance rights to women makes parents more averse to having a 
daughter rather than a son.5 In line with this, we also find an intensification of stated 
preferences for sons relative to daughters after the reform of approximately 1 percentage 
point following the reform, compared to a sample mean of 0.57. Our findings are 
consistent with the theoretical framework of Botticini and Siow (2003).6  
In research conducted in parallel with ours, Rosenblum (2015) shows an increase in 
excess girl mortality (after birth) following the inheritance reform.7 We focus on female 
foeticide as it is a particularly clean indicator of parental preferences for boys over girls – it 
involves an explicit decision to conduct prenatal detection of the sex of the child, and this 
needs to be followed up by the deliberate act of aborting the foetus if it is a girl. However, 
we also extend our analysis to study impacts of the reform on excess infant mortality 
among girls, and on son-biased fertility stopping. We find that the reform exacerbates son 
preference on both these margins.8 In particular, girls born post-reform and post-
ultrasound in families with a firstborn girl are 2.3-3.2 percentage points more likely to die 
before their reaching first birthday (equivalent to 32-42% of the sample mean), relative to 
                                               
5 Patriarchal norms, including those that stipulate that adult sons co-reside with (elderly) parents, 
exert effort on the family farm or enterprise, and provide support, are slow to change. For instance, 
parents may be concerned that even if daughters did acquire property and thus the means to 
provide old-age support to their parents, their husband’s family may appropriate the property or 
limit the daughters’ capacity to provide care to their parents. Please see Section 2.a for further 
discussion. 
6 In their model, Botticini and Siow argue that male-biased inheritance emerges from parents’ 
optimizing choices. Forcing parents to share post-mortem bequests between sons and daughters in 
patrilocal societies, where married daughters leave their parental home and sons do not, will tend to 
result in lower parental welfare. Hence it follows that equalizing inheritance rights creates 
incentives for parents to prefer not to have daughters. 
7 Estimates of the impact of the reform on child mortality are likely to be biased by sex-selective 
abortion, but the bias is downward implying that Rosenblum’s conclusions are robust to this 
selection. The bias arises because child mortality is defined on a selected sample of conceptions 
that survive the foetal period to the point of birth. There is no similar bias in looking at changes in 
(sex-selective) survival of the foetus as done in our paper. 
8 All estimates are intent-to-treat estimates. Different types of families may be at the different 
margins. 
7 
 
boys. Moreover, children in families with firstborn girl are approximately 9 percentage 
points more likely to have a younger sibling (equivalent to 12% of the sample mean), 
relative to families with firstborn boy. Together with our sex ratio results, these findings 
provide compelling evidence in favour of our contention that the inheritance reform 
intensified son preference in fertility.  
A natural question at this point is: if what we capture is a sticky social norm, do we 
find any corroborating evidence in support of this claim? In order to examine changes in 
patrilocal norms in response to the reform, we investigate co-residence of parents and 
adult sons and the distance of married daughters’ homes from their natal home using a 
different dataset: the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) 2006. We estimate 
an increase of 3 percentage points in the probability that a married daughter lives nearer 
the natal home (up to 10 km away), but this is not statistically significant.  We also find no 
significant impact on the extent of co-residence with sons. Together, these results suggest 
that patriarchal norms change only very slowly if at all, so that a sharp legislative change 
intended to favour daughters appears to have raised the perceived cost of daughters 
enough that parents became more averse to having them.9  
This paper provides the first evidence of the impact of the gender-equalizing 
inheritance reforms in Indian on female foeticide and son-biased fertility stopping 
behaviour. We also contribute to the literature by using a more stringent estimation 
strategy (permitting the use of state-year fixed effects as well as mother fixed effects) 
compared to existing studies analysing the impact of these reforms on various other 
outcomes.10 Our findings also contribute to existing evidence indicating that slow-moving 
social norms may frustrate the intentions of legal reform in the first decades after the 
passage of legislation (Aldashev et al. 2011).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
institutional background of the Hindu inheritance law in India, as well as details on the 
advent of ultrasound technology in the country. Section 3 describes the identification 
strategy and while Section 4 outlines the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents 
the key results while Section 6 concludes. 
                                               
9 Legislative change pertaining to the division of bequests is (in principle if not in compliance 
terms) immediate. In contrast, the linked institutions of dowry, patrilocality and co-residence with 
sons are expected to wither gradually, as a function of changes in the agrarian economy 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985, Guner 1998, Botticini and Siow 2003). In particular, we may expect 
that, as the returns to human capital rise, sons (and daughters) will acquire an education, and sons 
will no longer be tied to the occupations or assets of their fathers. This will spontaneously but 
gradually reduce co-residence and the attachment of sons’ labour to ancestral property. 
10 Results of some of the previous studies are potentially vulnerable to bias from omitted state- and 
year-varying variables. 
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2. Background 
2a. Inheritance Rights in India 
Gender inequality in inheritance rights in India was entrenched in The Hindu Succession 
Act (HSA) of 1956. Promulgated not long after India gained Independence from British 
rule, the HSA conferred the legal right to inherit ancestral property upon sons to the 
exclusion of daughters. Ancestral or “joint family property” consists of property principally 
inherited by an individual from their father, paternal grandfather or paternal great-
grandfather, plus any property that was jointly acquired by them or acquired separately but 
merged into the joint property. Separate property, on the other hand, includes that which 
was self-acquired (if acquired without detriment to the ancestral estate) and any property 
inherited from persons other than the individual’s father, paternal grandfather or paternal 
great-grandfather (Agarwal 1994). Under the HSA, daughters of a Hindu male dying 
intestate (i.e. without a will)11 had equal inheritance rights as sons to only their father’s 
separate property and his “notional” portion of joint family property, but had no direct 
inheritance rights to joint family property itself. Sons, on the other hand, not only inherited 
their share of the father’s own property and his “notional” portion of joint family property, 
but also had a direct right by birth to a share of the joint family property. In fact, all persons 
who acquired interest in the joint family property by birth were said to belong to the 
“Hindu coparcenary”, which is conceptually similar to an exclusive male membership club 
in relation to the issue of inheritance to which women had no access.  
For millions living in rural India, the most common form of property is land that is 
typically family-owned, which makes the gender bias in inheritance rights quite a significant 
phenomenon. Note that, as the reform refers to ancestral property, households residing in 
urban areas may own ancestral property/land in villages or towns, and thus also be affected 
by the reform. Thus the HSA, by excluding the daughter from participating in the 
coparcenary ownership of ancestral property, discriminated against the daughter. This 
inequality is, arguably, fundamental to the vulnerability of Indian women (Agarwal 1994), 
who are passed from father to husband, their economic insecurity contributing to early 
                                               
11 According to Deininger et al. (2013), the proportion of people who die without making a will in 
India is very high (around 65%, and probably even higher in rural areas). Recent newspaper articles 
have put the number at a much higher 80% (see https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Avoid-
disputes-write-a-Will/articleshow/802650.cms and http://www. fpgindia.org/2011/07/writing-a-
will-know-some-facts.html). The main reason cited for such low prevalence of wills in India is that 
people often find it uncomfortable discussing a will in their lifetime because of the air of fatality 
and gloom that surrounds it. Thus, all this would suggest that the HSA 1956 is what ultimately 
determines inheritance patterns within the family. 
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marriage, high fertility and domestic violence.  
Inheritance is one of the topics in the Indian constitution over which both the 
federal and the state governments have legislative authority. In 1976, the state of Kerala 
amended the HSA, subsequently followed by the states of Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil 
Nadu in 1989, and Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994 (see Figure 1). These amendments 
granted women equal inheritance rights to ancestral property provided they were 
unmarried at the time of the reform.12 In 2005, the federal Government of India swept all 
remaining states into the fold in a momentous constitutional reform.13 Further discussion 
of the institutional details of the reform is in Roy (2015), Brulé (2017), Andersen and 
Genicot (2015) and Rosenblum (2015).  
As pointed out by Andersen and Genicot (2015), a key point to note here is that 
there does not appear to be any systematic reason for the specific years in which the 
different states amended the HSA. Nonetheless, our empirical estimations include state 
fixed effects, year fixed effects and state-year fixed effects. The last soak up variation in any 
other state-level pro-female legislation that may have coincided with inheritance reform, 
for instance the establishment of Women’s Commissions (as discussed in Andersen and 
Genicot 2015), or other state-specific time-varying confounding factors. 
Previous work has shown that the HSA amendments have been largely 
unsuccessful in improving inheritance of women (Roy 2015; Brulé 2017; Landesa 2013): 
the proportion of women inheriting property from their parents remains woefully small 
and, importantly, did not increase significantly following the reform. Parents may have 
been reluctant to give daughters any property due to patrilocality14 and the related risk that 
the property ends up being controlled by the in-laws of the daughters.  It would thus be 
fair to ask why we may expect any impact of inheritance reform on parental manipulation 
of the sex composition of their children. In fact, the documented impacts in the cited 
studies refer to girls born before the reform. However, it is conceivable that, for the next 
generation of girls (the offspring of these women, who constitute the births in our study), 
the margin of adjustment is different.  
                                               
12 Kerala passed a slightly different amendment in the form of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family 
System (Abolition) Act that recognized all family members with an interest in the undivided family 
estate as being independent full owners of their shares from then onwards, i.e. abolished joint 
family property altogether. But since the spirit of this amendment was similar to those passed by 
the other reforming states, and could be expected to favorably affect the inheritance of the 
daughter, we club them together.  
13 We focus only on the state-level amendments to the HSA in this paper, and hence restrict our 
data to 2004. 
14 Patrilocality (also known as virilocality) is the social custom that requires married women to leave 
their parents’ home and reside with their husband’s family post marriage. 
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A large literature provides evidence that Indian parents have, for centuries, 
manipulated the sex composition of their children through son-biased fertility stopping and 
through lower investments in daughters (see a brief survey in Bhalotra et al. 2016 for 
instance). Since the mid-1980s, the availability of affordable prenatal sex detection 
techniques (alongside pre-existing availability of abortion) has provided a new tool to meet 
this end (discussed in Section 2.b). If sticky patriarchal norms lead parents to still prefer to 
leave their property to sons, the perceived cost of having a daughter is higher after the 
inheritance reform. Either daughters inherit property alongside their brothers, and parents 
are potentially less protected in their old age, or parents circumvent the law and daughters 
stand to contest their disinheritance in court. Even if parents can circumvent the law and 
the probability that daughters contest is small, the risk could deter parents from having 
daughters because under risk-aversion, uncertainty is more heavily weighted for negative 
outcomes. In addition, parents may incur psychic costs associated with non-compliance 
with the law, and with alienating their daughters. In fact, the risk that daughters contest 
their rights is rising and parents can probably see this insofar as a number of NGOs (e.g. 
Marg, SEWA, and Bitiya and ActionAid’s #Property for Her campaign) now pro-actively 
encourage women to claim their rights and provide legal support.15 Also, the returns to 
contesting rights to property (land) are increasing in line with the trend of rising land prices 
across India.16 A recent study of 9,300 litigants across 170 district courts, balanced across 
civil and criminal cases, found up to two thirds of cases relate to land and property and  
more than half of these disputes occurred within families.17 As of September 2017, the 
Business Standard notes “land conflicts [are] brewing across the country,”18 as well as 
creating family feuds across national boundaries,19 echoing writing over the past decades on 
“growing conflict about land.”20  
 
                                               
15 See a summary of NGO initiatives on the UN Women’s website here 
http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/943-provide-rights-based-education-and-awareness.html 
16 Rising agricultural land prices have been a noticeable trend across India since the early 2000s. As 
of 2013, M. Rajshekar reports a “3 to 100-fold rise in farm land prices” drawn from microstudies 
and anecdotal information on 68 villages in seven states gathered by the Economic Times: 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/agriculture/great-rural-land-rush-3-to-
100-fold-rise-in-farm-land-prices-may-not-bode-well/articleshow/25607513.cms 
17 Source: http://www.livemint.com/Politics/DIsifcuswHskm1jkXNdI2M/A-case-to-revisit-
Indias-land-laws.html  
18 Source: http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/conflicts-across-india-as-
states-create-land-banks-for-industry-investment-117091900140_1.html  
19 Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21171262  
20 Source: https://www.voanews.com/a/india-witnesses-growing-conflict-over-land-
101293609/124357.html  
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2b. Sex Ratios and Ultrasound Technology in India 
The phenomenon of “missing women” was initially highlighted in Miller (1981) and Sen 
(1990). Recent estimates suggest that among the stock of women who could potentially be 
alive in India today, over 25 million are “missing” (Anderson and Ray 2012).  The 
population sex ratio in India has been unnaturally skewed in favour of males since the first 
recorded census. Historically, parents have manipulated the ratio of surviving girls to boys 
by the practice of son-biased fertility stopping (Arnold et al. 1998; Bhalotra and van Soest 
2008) and multiple forms of neglect including breastfeeding duration, immunization and 
nutrition (Jayachandran and Kuziemko 2011; Oster 2009).  
Since the availability of prenatal sex detection technology, it has become possible to 
manipulate the sex ratio by committing sex-selective abortion or female foeticide, the 
material and psychic costs of which tend to be lower than the costs of eliminating girls 
after birth. Abortion has been legal in India since 1972 and the costs of scans and abortion 
are affordable, albeit with prices increasing in the reliability and safety of these procedures. 
It is estimated that as many as 0.48 million girls or 6% of potential female births during 
1995-2005 were selectively aborted annually during 1995-2005, which is more than the 
number of girls born in the UK each year (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). In contrast to the 
more subtle and uncertain procedure of neglect, foeticide is a conscious and staged act and, 
for this reason, it provides a clean measure of parents’ preferences for having sons rather 
than daughters. 
The first imports of ultrasound scanners are recorded in the mid-1980s, associated 
with India’s first attempt at import liberalization (see Figure 2b). There was a sharp 
increase in availability in the mid-1990s, created by the relaxation of industrial licensing 
requirements, which led to domestic production of ultrasound machines.21 Bhalotra and 
Cochrane (2010) show that the sex ratio at birth for birth orders two and higher tracks the 
availability of ultrasound, and that a disproportionate share of foeticide is conducted in 
families with a firstborn girl. They also show that the sex of the firstborn child is quasi-
random (see Figure 4 Panel A replicated from them) and Abrevaya (2009) shows this is 
also the case for Indian and Chinese families in US. Although stated son preference in 
India is declining over the sample period (Figure 3), Figure 4 Panel B shows a sharp drop 
in the probability of a female birth that appears after ultrasound is introduced and that this 
is evident only in families with a firstborn girl. 
                                               
21 For further details on the timing of availability of ultrasound technology etc. please refer to pages 
12-13 in Section 5 of Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010). 
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A common pattern in India and other patrilineal societies is that daughters take 
their bequest at marriage as dowry and marry some distance from their natal home (Guner 
1998; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985), while sons tend to co-reside with parents, work on 
the land, and subsequently inherit it. Indeed, Botticini and Siow (2003) postulate that a 
rationale for the origin and persistence of these arrangements is that they incentivize sons 
to work on the father’s land, contributing to wealth creation as well as old-age security.    
3. Identification Strategy   
Our objective is to obtain causal impacts of the inheritance reform on the preference for 
sons in India. For reasons discussed earlier, we focus upon son preference expressed in the 
stark act of sex-selective abortion (or female foeticide). With appropriate caveats, we seek 
to corroborate this with data on reported son preference. We then extend the analysis to 
study the impacts of the reform on excess girl mortality after birth, and son-biased fertility 
stopping, both of which are alternative ways of adjusting the sex composition of surviving 
births. This allows us to check whether prenatal mortality (foeticide) is simply substituting 
for postnatal mortality or fertility stopping behaviour, or if, potentially, different women 
respond to the reform on these different margins.22 
The reform was implemented by individual state governments, so its incidence was 
staggered across the states, generating potential discontinuities in the outcome specific to 
state and birth year. However, as sex-selective abortion was infeasible prior to availability 
of prenatal sex detection technologies (which we henceforth abbreviate as “ultrasound”), 
we expect that any impacts of the reform on desired sex ratios will only be evident in the 
actual sex ratio at birth among post-ultrasound cohorts. We therefore interact an indicator 
for cohorts born post-reform (Rst) with an indicator for cohorts born post-ultrasound 
(Postt), allowing for the main effects of each.   
The initial estimated equation for sex ratios is: 
𝑦"#$% = 𝛼$ + 𝛽%	+	𝛿𝑅$% + 𝜃(𝑅$% ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡%) + 𝜀"#$%  (1) 
where 𝑦"#$%  is a binary variable that equals 1 if child i born to mother m in state s in year t 
is a girl and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100 so that the regression coefficients can be 
interpreted as percentage point changes in the sex ratio at birth. 𝛼$ and 𝛽% represent state 
and year of birth fixed effects. 𝑅$% is a dummy variable that equals 1 for cohorts born after 
                                               
22 We do not directly analyse investments after birth because data on investments (including 
breastfeeding, vaccinations, visits to the doctor etc.) are only gathered for children born 3-5 years 
before the survey date. The survey dates of the NFHS rounds are such that we do not have 
sufficient pre- versus post-reform variation in these data. However, other studies show that under-
investment in girls (relative to boys) maps into excess girl mortality in India (see Anukriti et al. 2016, 
and references therein).  
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the reform in a reforming state and zero for cohorts born before the reform or in a non-
reforming state. For instance, 𝑅$% defines potential births in Kerala in 1972-1975 and in 
Karnataka in 1972-1993 as unexposed to the reform, and potential births in Kerala in 
1976-2005 and in Karnataka in 1994-2005 as exposed.  
In the absence of sex-selection, the outcome probability (i.e. the probability that a 
birth is a girl) is close to a half (see Appendix Table A2c). After and only after the 
introduction of ultrasound scanners, the share of girls at second and higher-order births 
has declined steadily, and the magnitude of the decline lies outside the range regarded as 
consistent with biological variation or slow-changing environmental factors (Bhalotra and 
Cochrane 2010). Following Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) who test and defend this 
formulation with reference to the timing of the first ultrasound scanner imports in India, 
we construct a dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% which equals 1 if the year of the child’s birth is after 
1985 and zero otherwise. Since diffusion of ultrasound scanners at the state level is likely to 
be correlated with demand, we use the national timing of ultrasound availability determined 
by exogenous changes in India’s import tariffs. The coefficient of interest in this 
specification is 𝜃, which captures the differential impact of the inheritance reform on sex 
ratios at birth after the availability of ultrasound technology.  
A familiar concern with difference-in-difference specifications such as (1) is that 
there may be state-specific time-varying omitted variables that are correlated with the 
introduction of the inheritance reform. Put differently, the identifying assumption is that 
the dates of introduction of the reform are not correlated with pre-trends in the sex ratio at 
birth.  
We create within-state variation in the incentive to sex-select at the family level by 
the sex of the firstborn child on the premise that this is quasi-random: parents who, by the 
random hand of nature, are assigned a son at first birth are significantly less likely to engage 
in female foeticide for subsequent conceptions. This is supported by our data. Firstly, 
Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the proportion of females among first births in India lies 
within the normal range (48.8-49.26 percent) during our sample period, and shows no 
tendency to change over time. Secondly, Table 8 shows that families with firstborn boys 
and those with firstborn girls are similar along a number of observables.23 Thirdly, we find 
no significant change in sex ratio of first births post reform post ultrasound (see Appendix 
Table A2c). Finally, exogeneity of firstborn sex has also been previously defended in other 
                                               
23 Appendix Table A14 shows that this holds for both pre-reform and post-reform periods in our 
NFHS sample. 
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studies (Almond and Edlund 2008; Abrevaya 2009; Dasgupta and Bhat 1997; Bhalotra and 
Cochrane 2010). 
Using the randomness of sex of firstborn child begets us two advantages. First, any 
omitted variables at the state-year level would now have to vary systematically between 
families in a state and birth-year with the sex of the firstborn child.  Second, we can now 
include state-year fixed effects that flexibly control for any omitted state-year variation that 
may be correlated with the passage of inheritance reform. This richer, more rigorous 
specification is: 
𝑦"#$% = 𝛼$ + 𝛽%+	𝛾$% + 𝛿𝑅$% + 𝜃7𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑟𝑙# + 𝜃=𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑟𝑙# ∗ 𝑅$% + 𝜃>𝑅$% ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡%+𝜃?𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑟𝑙# ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% + 𝜃@(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑟𝑙# ∗ 𝑅$% ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡%) + 𝜀"#$% (2) 
where 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑖𝑟𝑙# is an indicator for the firstborn child of the mother m being female, 	𝛾$% 
denotes state-year fixed effects, and the rest of the notation are as defined for equation (1). 
We consistently control for all of the underlying main effects and secondary interaction 
terms.24  Since we include state-year fixed effects, the level effect of the reform (𝛿) and the 
coefficient (𝜃>) on the interaction term 𝑅$%*𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% are no longer identified. However, our 
confidence that we identify causal effects is substantially increased. The coefficient of 
interest is now 𝜃@, which captures the impact of inheritance reform on the relative chances 
that a birth is female in households with a firstborn daughter relative to households with a 
firstborn son in the post-ultrasound period. We model the sex ratio only for second-order 
births to mitigate concerns about potentially endogenous continuation of fertility. 
However, the pattern of our results remains broadly similar when we include third and 
fourth-order births, although the coefficients are smaller and not consistently statistically 
significant across all specifications (see discussion in Section 5.2). 
As discussed in Section 2.b, although ultrasound scanners were imported into India 
from the mid-1980s onwards, there was a sharp increase in their supply once local 
production was initiated in the wake of industrial de-licensing and related economic 
reforms in the mid-1990s (Figure 2a).25 To capture this non-linearity in evolution of supply, 
                                               
24 In other words, we control for the main effect “firstgirl”, an indicator for families with a firstborn 
girl vs a firstborn boy. As having a son confers “status” on Indian women, it may be that mothers 
with firstborn boys have more say and are allowed to keep a later-born girl. This is accounted for 
by the main effect.  
25 The first private clinic offering sex determination is thought to have appeared in 1982-83 (Sudha 
and Rajan 1999). After that supply increased at an increasing rate, fuelled by imports and the 
growth of local production. In the mid-1990s large-scale local production of ultrasound scanners 
was initiated by General Electric and other multinational firms in joint ventures with Indian firms 
(Grover and Vijayvergiya 2006, Mahal et al. 2006, Murthy et al. 2006). Government data show that 
the number of ultrasound machines manufactured in India increased 15-fold between 1988 and 
15 
 
we divide the post ultrasound period into an early and a late diffusion period and replace 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% with 𝑝= and 𝑝>	in Equations (1) and (2), where 𝑝= equals 1 for 1985-94 (early 
ultrasound period) and 𝑝> equals 1 for 1995-2004 (late ultrasound period). 𝑝7is the omitted 
category that captures the pre-ultrasound period 1972-1984. The rationale for these choices 
is detailed in Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010). Our findings are not sensitive to varying the 
cut-off years by one or two years on each side of the chosen thresholds or to using 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% 
instead of 𝑝= and 𝑝> separately (results are available on request). 
Since the reform is at the state level and the sex of the firstborn child is quasi-
random, any differential uptake of ultrasound scans and sex-selective abortion facilities 
across mothers within a state will affect interpretation of the distribution of impacts on the 
treated but will not bias interpretation of the average intent-to-treat effects. However, there 
may be mother-level selection into conception that is correlated with the inheritance 
reform and the availability of prenatal sex detection facilities. To allow for this, we show 
estimates conditional upon mother fixed effects. These comprehensively control for time-
invariant differences between mothers in preferences, information and local facilities. The 
estimated equation looks similar to (2) except that 𝛼$	is replaced with 𝛼#.  
As discussed earlier, previous studies on India’s inheritance reform exploit state 
and birth cohort variation in exposure to reform, which leaves the estimates vulnerable to 
bias from omitted state- and year-varying variables. In addition, previous studies either 
impose an age of exposure of the mother (e.g. Roy 2015) or use aggregate data and thus 
cannot account for individual variation in exposure (e.g. Anderson and Genicot 2015). In 
contrast, our paper has a clean measure of exposure defined on the potential birth year of 
the child, obtains within-mother estimates, as well as shows robustness to using mother-
level exposure to the reform (see Section 5.1). Our identification strategy is therefore 
considerably more stringent.  
The specification that we estimate to investigate changes in reported son 
preference is the same as Equation (2), with the dependent variable being the desired or 
ideal number of sons divided by the desired or ideal number of total children, as reported 
by the mother. The resulting variable is bounded between 0 and 1. However, this is 
measured only at the time of survey. We construct a time-varying measure of reported son 
                                                                                                                                         
2003 with especially marked increases after 1994 (Grover and Vijayvergiya 2006, Murthy et al. 2006, 
George 2006). Ultrasound scans dominate prenatal sex-determination, as they are relatively cheap 
and non-invasive. The technology is continuously improving, providing finer resolution of the fetal 
image earlier in pregnancy, and the scanners are growing smaller and more mobile. 
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preference based upon the age of the mother at the time of the survey by exploiting cohort 
variation in stated preferences. We assume that son preference at age 20 determines fertility 
choices, but we confirmed that small variations on this choice of age made no significant 
difference to the results.26 Thus, women aged 20 in the survey year 1998 will define son 
preference for their cohort for the year 1998, while the preferences of women aged 40 who 
were surveyed in 1998 will define son preference in 1978, the year in which they were age 
20. This assumes that reported preferences do not vary within woman as a function of her 
ages or her fertility experience. This is a strong assumption and so we only regard these 
findings as auxiliary – as an attempt to look at whether stated preferences are consistent 
with our evidence on behavioural change. In this specification, the “Reform” variable 𝑅$% 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the mother is 20 years old at the time of the reform in 
the reforming state and zero otherwise.  
We also estimate the impacts of the inheritance reform on excess girl mortality and 
fertility, using the specification of Equation (2). In case of mortality, the dependent variable 
captures whether or not the child died on or before reaching their first birthday, multiplied 
by 100. We present results differentially by gender of child. In case of fertility, the 
dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the child has younger siblings, 
multiplied by 100.  
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We primarily use the National Family Health Survey (NFHS) which records the complete 
fertility histories of women aged 15-49 and thus allows us to identify the sex and birth year 
of every child for a representative and large sample of women. The birth histories of 
women span the pre- and post-reform periods in every reforming state. In addition, the 
birth histories identify biological children of a mother rather than all children in a 
household. The surveys also ask women their desired number of children, and the desired 
numbers of sons and daughters. The NFHS is a household survey representative at the 
state level, covering 26 states of India,27 and it was conducted in three waves in 1991/2, 
1998/9 and 2005/6. We pool the three rounds and use data on birth cohorts 1972 to 2004. 
As mentioned in Section 3, we restrict the sample for our main analyses to up to second-
order births (but also present additional results later including up to third and fourth-order 
                                               
26 70% of women in our NFHS sample have had their first child by the age 20. The median age at 
first birth is 18. Our results for son preference are robust to using 18 instead of 20 years as the cut-
off age for mother’s son preference to determine her fertility choices. 
27 The HSA (1956) did not apply to Jammu and Kashmir (Agarwal, 1995), hence this state is 
excluded from the analysis. In addition, Sikkim, one of the smaller states, is not part of the 1992 
wave. 
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births for robustness). The total number of births is 490,833, born to 169,728 mothers. Of 
this, 169,728 are first order births and 136,013 are second order births. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix Table A12. The mean sex ratio 
(females/males) is 0.48 while mean son preference (defined as the ratio of ideal number of 
sons over ideal number of total children reported by mother) is 0.57. Appendix Table A13 
shows a pre-reform balance test between reforming and non-reforming states. The only 
systematic difference is in reported son preference.  
In order to explore the impact of the inheritance reform on co-residence of parents 
and sons and the distance of daughters’ marital home from their natal home, we use the 
Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) 2006. The REDS is a nationally 
representative survey for rural India that covers 17 major states.28 To maintain 
comparability with the NFHS sample, we use data on birth cohorts 1972 to 2004. The 
analysis sample comprises 41,105 individual births born to 8,154 mothers. Of this, 6,498 
are first order births and 5,941 are second order births. 
Results 
5.1 Sex Ratios at Birth 
Table 1 presents estimates of Equation (2). The reported coefficients are the triple-
difference coefficients that capture the differential impact of the reform on the probability 
that a birth is female among post-ultrasound cohorts in families with a firstborn girl 
relative to families with a firstborn boy.29 Our estimates in Column 1 indicate a significant 
decline in the probability that a birth is a girl by 3.8-4.3 percentage points. These results are 
robust to inclusion of household level control variables (Column 2), state-specific linear 
trends (Column 3) and state-year fixed effects (Column 4). Our estimates are larger though 
not statistically significantly different conditional on mother fixed effects (Column 5). All 
throughout, we cannot reject equality of the coefficients for the two periods marking early 
and late diffusion of ultrasound. This is plausible given that “treatability” was higher in the 
first period (low hanging fruit) while availability of ultrasound was higher in the second 
period, and these differences may offset one another. 
                                               
28 The 17 major states are: Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, West Bengal, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, 
Chattisgarh, Uttarkhand and Jharkhand, which account for more than 92% of the total population 
of India (Census of India, 2011). 
29 The full specification (including the double and triple-differences and level coefficients) is 
reported in Appendix Table A1. 
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The estimated effect size is large.30 However, compared with recent papers in 
which the sex ratio is an outcome (some using the same Indian data), it does not seem 
implausible. Bhalotra, Chakravarty, Mookherjee and Pino (forthcoming) find that among 
Hindu families, above-median tenancy registration rates in West Bengal in eastern India 
raised the proportion of boys born at second and higher birth order by 5.2 percentage 
points, an effect that is larger than here. Bhalotra, Clots and Iyer (2018) find that 
“replacing” a Hindu with a Muslim state legislator increases the probability of a girl birth in 
the district from which they are elected by 1.8 percentage points. This is a large effect if 
one considers how little leeway a Muslim legislator might have to influence sex-selection 
among Hindus. In the current setting, it seems plausible that a legal reform that challenges 
deeply entrenched social norms has a larger impact. Almond et al. (forthcoming) find that, 
among second births that followed a firstborn girl, sex ratios increased by 2.8 percentage 
point in the four years following land reform in China. This is a smaller effect than here 
but it refers to a time (1978-1984) when the cost of accessing ultrasound access was still 
high in China and it was largely only available in provincial capitals. In contrast, our study 
covers a period through which ultrasound had diffused rapidly through India, reaching the 
Southern states and rural areas, and was available at low cost. 
Since sex ratios have historically been less male-biased in the Southern states of 
India (Miller 1981, Sen 2003), there is a common perception that there are lower rates of 
sex-selective abortion in the South. Since the reforming states are in the South, we 
conducted a plausibility check by investigating reported ultrasound usage in the reforming 
states. Ultrasound scans are a necessary albeit not sufficient condition for prenatal sex-
detection.31 The 1998 and 2005 rounds of the NFHS ask whether or not the mother had an 
ultrasound scan in the 3-4 years preceding the survey date. Using this we find that mean 
ultrasound usage in reforming states was 16% compared to 7% in non-reforming states, 
with the difference of 9 percentage points being statistically significant at the 1% level 
(Appendix Table B3).32 These are means over families with first born daughters and sons. 
Since sex-selective abortion is significantly higher in first-girl families (see Bhalotra and 
                                               
30 It is 61-69% of the potential female births that Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010) estimate did not 
occur in an all-India sample due to ultrasound use during 1995-2005. 
31 In other words, a scan may be conducted as prenatal check and not be followed by abortion but 
for purposive girl abortion to occur, information on foetal sex is a necessary pre-condition. 
Similarly, data on use of scans in an area indicates availability (supply), even if it also represents 
demand. 
32 It is also striking that the penetration of ultrasound access in rural areas (which were more likely 
to have been affected by the inheritance reform as it referred to ancestral property, a lot of which is 
land) was significantly greater in the reforming than in the non-reforming states, at 10% vs 4% (see 
Appendix Table B4). 
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Cochrane 2010), 16% would be a lower bound since first-girl families are roughly half of 
all. In any case, the fact that this is larger than the estimated effect size in our analysis of 
about 4 percentage points enhances the plausibility of our results. Please see Online 
Appendix B. 
We also investigated using the exposure of the mother to the reform (a function of 
her birth cohort) rather than exposure of her potential births (a function of the years in 
which she makes reproductive decisions). The estimating equation for this specification is:  
𝑓#$% = 𝛼′$ + 𝛽′% + 𝛾′$𝑡 + 	𝛿′𝐸$% + 𝜀#$%  (3) 
where  𝑓#$%  denotes the proportion of female births to mother m who was born in year t 
living in state s. This is specifically measured as G/(G+B) where G is the number of girl 
children and B is the number of boy children born to the mother. The mother’s exposure 
to the inheritance reform is denoted by a binary variable 𝐸$% that equals 1 if the mother 
was 14 years old or younger at the time of reform and zero otherwise.33 The coefficient of 
interest is 𝛿′ which captures the differential impact of the reform on the proportion of 
female births to treated mothers, relative to control mothers (i.e. those who were 15 or 
older at the time of reform in the reforming states or those who lived in non-reforming 
states). The results are presented in Appendix Table A7. We estimate that the proportion 
of female births declined by 1 percentage point in response to the reform (Column 1), after 
controlling for state and mother’s year of birth fixed effects. This is consistent with our 
increased female foeticide results for child-level exposure presented in Table 1, although 
the exact magnitudes of these coefficients are not directly comparable.34 The mother-level 
result is robust to controlling for household level variables (Column 2). With the inclusion 
of state-specific linear trends in Column 3, the magnitude of the coefficient remains 
unchanged even if it loses statistical significance at conventional levels. 
5.2 Sex Ratios at Birth: Robustness Checks 
We have already discussed robustness of our sex ratio results to some fairly demanding 
controls, including state-year fixed effects and mother fixed effects. We now present some 
further checks. 
                                               
33 The state-level reforms that we investigate here only affected the inheritance potential of women 
if they were unmarried at the time of the passage of the reform in their state. Data from NFHS 
indicates that less than 10% women are married before turning 14. 
34 The dependent variable in the child-level exposure results on female foeticide is an indicator for a girl 
birth (multiplied by 100) and so the coefficients are percentage point changes in the chances of having a 
girl birth. Here, in case of the mother-level exposure results, the dependent variable is instead the share 
of girls among all children born to a mother. 
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We control for state-year variation in the establishment of State Commissions for 
Women which, in principle, may confound the estimated impacts of the inheritance reform 
on sex ratios at birth. In fact, our inclusion of state-year fixed effects addresses this (and all 
other state-year varying omitted variables) but we nevertheless do this to identify how the 
coefficient of interest changes in response to controlling for this identified reform.35  First 
we include an additive control but in a second specification we interact the Women’s 
Commission indicator with firstgirlm*post (see Table 2, Columns 1-2). In both cases, we 
control for state-specific linear trends instead of state-year fixed effects. Our results stand 
up to this specification change. 
Maharashtra and Karnataka passed the reform after the constitutional amendment 
mandating a third of seats in village councils for women in local government in India. We 
test robustness of our results to the exclusion of Maharashtra and Karnataka from the 
sample (see Table 2, Column 3). The coefficients are not significantly different.  
Since the reforming states are all in southern India we need to address the potential 
concern that we are merely picking up a “southern state effect”. Although inclusion of 
state fixed effects and state-year fixed effects ought to account for any such time-invariant 
or time-varying effects, we nevertheless repeat our analysis by restricting our sample to 
only the reforming states i.e. Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and 
Karnataka, allowing us to exploit variation in dates of reform within southern Indian, 
rather than variation between the southern and the northern parts of the country. With this 
restricted sample, we are no longer able to identify different coefficients for the early and 
late diffusion of ultrasound because all the reforming states had passed the reform by 1994. 
Hence, we use a common 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 period that covers the entire period of ultrasound 
availability from 1985 onwards. Due to the smaller number of clusters, we adjust standard 
errors using wild t-bootstrapping following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). We 
continue to find evidence for increase in female foeticide following the passage of 
inheritance reform (see Table 2, Column 4). Note that the southern states have historically 
exhibited lower son preference36 and are known to be more gender progressive than states 
in north India. Thus, it seems reasonable to think that these states would equalize 
                                               
35 Anderson and Genicot (2015) control for legal changes such as this but their outcome (suicide) is 
measured at the state-year level, and so their specification cannot accommodate state-year fixed 
effects. 
36 Appendix Table A13 indicates that reported son preference in our NFHS dataset is 0.56 in the 
southern states compared to 0.6 in the rest of India. 
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inheritance rights for women earlier. This is likely to be correct, but we address it in our 
analysis.37  
Alternative explanations for sex ratios at birth becoming more male-biased in 
general include differential access to technology across families, differences in returns to 
education for boys versus girls, etc. However, our strategy effectively looks for systematic 
differences between first-son and first-daughter families that, we show, are balanced on 
observable characteristics (see Table 8). This implies that our findings are robust to these 
macro-level changes. Moreover, our strategy does not pick up general trends in the sex 
ratio but, rather, sharp changes in the sex ratio coincident with the introduction of 
inheritance reform.  
Another concern may be that sex ratio at birth of second born children is unlikely 
to reflect the (complete) average effect of reform on a family’s total gender composition of 
children as mother’s fertility is unlikely to be complete. To address this concern, we test the 
robustness of our sex ratio results by restricting our sample to mothers who have 
completed fertility defined in one of two ways: a) mothers aged 35 or more at the time of 
survey and b) mothers whose actual fertility is greater than desired fertility. As Table 2, 
Columns 5-6 indicates, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
As mentioned in Section 3, we focus upon second births to mitigate the concern 
that a select group of women progresses to third and higher birth orders, while 93.7% of 
Indian women have a 2nd birth (NFHS data). However, we also test the robustness of the 
sex ratio results to including up to third births (see Appendix Table A2a) and up to fourth 
births (see Appendix Table A2b). The pattern of results is similar, indicating increased 
female foeticide after the reform, but the coefficients are smaller and not consistently 
statistically significant. 
Since the inheritance reform was to the Hindu Succession Act and pertained to 
land, we may expect it to have had larger impacts on Hindu land-owning households than 
on Muslim or landless households. If we make no pre/post ultrasound distinction in the 
specification, we obtain the expected significantly larger impact of the reform among 
Hindu land-owning households (see Appendix Table A3).38 This is in line with previous 
                                               
37 We do this essentially by controlling for state-year fixed effects and looking to identify sharp 
changes in the trend in the sex ratio at birth in firstborn girl families relative to firstborn boy 
families that are coincident with the state-specific year of the reform. We find increased female 
foeticide following the reform even though these are states with lower son preference. 
38 The coefficient on firstgirl*reform*Hindu*land-owning is a bit smaller than the coefficients of interest 
in Table 1 because the latter isolates this effect post-ultrasound. 
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studies (e.g. Rosenblum 2015; Roy 2015) that have looked at effects of the reform on other 
outcomes.39 
The reason we did not leverage the greater exposure of Hindu land-owning 
households to the reform for our main specification is that our paper involves an 
interaction between inheritance reform (which changed incentives) and indicators for the 
availability of ultrasound scanners (which lowered costs). However, access to ultrasound 
did not line up with exposure to inheritance reform. In particular, Muslims and landless 
households were less affected by the reform but, on account of living disproportionately in 
urban areas, they had earlier/greater access to ultrasound facilities (see Online Appendix 
C).  
We test the robustness of the sex ratio results to using the alternative dataset, 
REDS 2006 (see Appendix Table A4a). We observe a similar pattern of results as with 
NFHS.40 We also repeat the array of further robustness checks outlined above using REDS 
2006 (see Appendix Tables A4b and A4c) and observe a similar pattern of results. 
Given that the non-reforming states are diverse, we test whether our results are 
robust to excluding certain states from this control sample. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients of interest are robust to dropping first the northern and then the eastern states, 
although statistical significance is lost in the latter case (Appendix Tables A5 and A6).41  
To recapitulate, we exploit variation in year of inheritance reform created by five 
states having reformed before a nationwide reform was implemented in 2005. As a 
coherence check on our findings, we looked to see whether was a decline in the share of 
female births in the late reforming states after 2005. We cannot obtain causal estimates of 
this but the data are consistent with it. According to the Census of India (2011), the sex 
ratio in the 0-6 year age group fell from 918 to 911 females per 1000 males for the major 
late reforming states (and for early reforming states, from 944 to 938). 
Finally, Indian states are large regions that, in many cases, have their own languages 
and inter-state migration is small in general (Topalova 2010). However, we cannot rule out 
that the reform may have stimulated inter-state migration. Since we measure the incidence 
of reform in terms of the potential birth year of the child, a specification including mother 
fixed effects ensures that selective migration will not bias our estimates unless it occurs 
between births. To investigate this potential bias, we re-estimate the equation restricting 
                                               
39 Online Appendix D discusses some of the measurement issues with land ownership in NFHS as 
well as REDS. 
40 The coefficients are larger but the sample is now rural and not matched to the NFHS sample. 
41 The northern states are Haryana, HP, New Delhi, Punjab, Rajasthan and UP. The eastern states 
are Assam, Bihar, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Sikkim, 
West Bengal and Tripura. 
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the sample to women who had not migrated between births. This can be done because the 
NFHS surveys ask women how long they have lived in their current place of residence, and 
we know the birth year of their first and last child. Since the current place of residence is 
much more local than their state, this is a stringent test. Our results are robust to this 
(available on request). 
5.3 Reported Son Preference  
Table 3 reports results for stated son preference. The reported coefficients are the triple-
difference coefficients.42 We find that families with firstborn girls are 1 percentage point 
more likely to report preferring sons over daughters relative to families with firstborn sons, 
post-reform and post-ultrasound (Column 1). This is robust to inclusion of household 
level controls (Column 2), state linear trends (Column 3) and state-year fixed effects 
(Column 4).43 These results are therefore consistent with evidence of sex selection 
discussed earlier. Women who are in the early reproductive years (around age 20) after the 
reform report higher son preference than women of the same age before the reform. This 
result is particularly striking since overall son preference has been declining in India (Figure 
3). Thus reported preferences for sons move in line with revealed preferences for sons 
(revealed in manipulation of the sex ratio at birth and, as we shall see below, also in post-
birth girl mortality and son-biased fertility stopping). 
5.4 Excess Girl Mortality After Birth 
Excess girl mortality after birth is an alternative to female foeticide when parents want to 
adjust the sex composition of surviving births. Our results for the impact of the reform on 
excess girl mortality are presented Table 4. The reported coefficients are the triple-
difference coefficients.44 The estimates indicate that post-reform and post-ultrasound, girls 
in families with a firstborn girl are 2.3-3.2 percentage point more likely to die before 
reaching their first birthday, relative to boys (Column 1). This effect is equivalent to 32-
42% of the sample mean for child mortality among girls (which is 7.3%). This result is 
robust to inclusion of all controls (Columns 2-5). In contrast, boys in families with a 
firstborn girl are 1.2-1.6 percentage point less likely to die before reaching their first 
birthday relative to the control group. Averaging across the country, there is evidence of 
some substitution of postnatal mortality with prenatal mortality (foeticide) in the post-
                                               
42 The full specification (including the double and triple-differences and level coefficients) is 
reported in Appendix Table A8. 
43 Since by construction, the dependent variable does not vary within mother, we do not present 
results from a specification with mother fixed effects for reported son preference. 
44 The full specification (including the double and triple-differences and level coefficients) is 
reported in Appendix Table A9. 
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ultrasound period (Anukriti et al. 2016). Here we see that in the reforming states, the 
equalization of inheritance rights led to the elimination of girls in both ways, before and 
after birth. This is consistent with different women responding to the inheritance reform 
on these different margins. 
5.5 Son-Biased Fertility Stopping 
A further margin of adjustment in the sex of surviving births is son-biased fertility 
stopping. Our estimates for the impact of the reform on such behaviour are presented in 
Table 5. The reported coefficients are the triple-difference coefficients.45 We find that, 
following inheritance reform, in the late ultrasound period (p3), children in families with a 
firstborn girl are approximately 9 percentage point more likely to have a younger sibling 
(equivalent to 12% of the sample mean) relative to the control group (Column 1). The 
coefficient for the early ultrasound period (p2) is also positive, though not statistically 
significant.46 These results are robust to controls (Columns 2-4), and increase in magnitude 
following the addition of mother fixed effects (Column 5). 
Taken together, our finding that inheritance reform exacerbates son preference in 
each of the three domains in which it may be potentially exercised, is compelling. As 
discussed in Section 5.3 above, this is also corroborated with available data on reported son 
preference. Given the caveats discussed earlier with the stated preference results, we 
underline the behavioural evidence of son-preferring behaviours in three different 
domains, all of which are consistent with stated son preferences. 
5.4 Investigating (Shifting) Social Norms 
Historically, sons have enjoyed inheritance rights to family property in the form of post-
mortem bequests in societies where daughters receive pre-mortem bequests in the form of 
dowry (Goody 1973). Botticini and Siow (2003) formalize this in terms of parents 
incentivizing sons to provide effort on family property. A critical premise is that sons stay 
and co-reside with parents while married daughters leave the parental home (patrilocality). 
Forcing parents to share post-mortem bequests equally between daughters and sons may 
therefore have implications for familial ties. In this section, we explore using REDS 2009 
the impact of the inheritance reform on two specific dimensions of such ties: co-residence 
of parents and adult sons, and distance of daughters’ marital homes from their parental 
homes.  
                                               
45 The full specification (including the double and triple-differences and level coefficients) is 
reported in Appendix Table A10. 
46 We cannot reject the equality of the coefficients for the two ultrasound periods at conventional 
levels. 
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By requiring parents to give daughters and sons equal portions of ancestral 
property, the inheritance reform limits parents’ ability to reward sons’ effort invested in 
family property that may in turn lower their inclination to co-reside. Hence, we first test 
whether exposure to the reform impacts the incidence of co-residence between parents 
and adult sons. Co-residence is the most widespread form of physical, emotional, 
economic, and social security for parents in contemporary India. 56% of families in our 
REDS sample co-reside with adult sons.  
We define a parent-offspring pair in a given household as “exposed to reform” if 
there is at least one daughter in the household who is 14 years or younger at the time of 
reform (i.e. likely to be unmarried).47  This is similar to our measure of mother’s exposure 
to reform (Equation 3). We study two sets of parent-offspring pairs: the household head’s 
parents (i.e. grandparents) residence with the head and his or her siblings, and the 
household head’s residence with his or her children. Adult sons are defined as married men 
aged eighteen years or older at the time of the survey.48 We restrict the sample to the subset 
of families with at least one living parent and one adult son, with any number of adult 
daughters (including none).  
The estimating equation for co-residence of parents and adult sons is: 
𝐶"EF$% = 𝛼′′$ + 𝛽′′% + 𝛾′′𝑡$% + 𝜇′′𝐸EF$% + 𝜀"EF$%  (4) 
where the dependent variable of interest, 𝐶"EF$% is a dummy variable capturing whether or 
not any surviving parent i (parent with adult children) in a given natal household h from 
parent-child pair of generation g in state s born in year t co-resides with an adult son. 𝐸EF$%  
is a dummy variable that captures the pair’s exposure to reform as defined above.  
The results are presented in Table 6. Conditioning on state and year of birth fixed 
effects and household level control variables, the coefficient on exposure to reform is 
negative but not statistically significant (Column 1). Restricting to married adult sons only, 
and adding either state linear trends or state-year fixed effects, does not change the result 
(Columns 2-4).  Thus, we find no evidence that reform exposure reduces co-residence of 
parents with sons.49 This appears to be a sticky social norm, corroborating previous work 
on norms supporting gender inequality (Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013).  
                                               
47 As mentioned earlier, NFHS data indicates that very few (less than 10%) women are married 
before turning 14. 
48 Restricting the sample to married adult sons also helps us account for children’s widespread 
residence with parents until marriage in India. 
49 We do not find any impact on co-residence of parents with adult daughters (results available on 
request). 
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To examine the impact of exposure to the reform on distance of married women 
from their natal home, we use a similar specification as Equation (4) where the dependent 
variable is a binary measure that takes the value 1 if the distance between a married 
woman’s marital and natal homes is 10 kilometers or less and zero otherwise.50 We choose 
this threshold as it captures the lowest quartile of women’s marriage distances in our 
sample. “Exposure to reform” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the woman was 14 or 
younger at the time of reform and zero otherwise. The results are presented in Table 7. 
Women exposed to the reform are 3 percentage points (significant at 10 percent) more 
likely to marry into homes within 10 kilometers of their natal households (Column 2).  We 
also find a barely significant effect in the same direction if we use 20 kilometers rather than 
10 (Appendix Table A11). Thus, it appears that there was in fact some norm-shifting in 
terms of daughters marrying closer to home, although co-residence often coincides with 
the son working on the land and then inheriting it, so the latter is the more important, and 
the more rigid measure, of patrilocality.  
To elaborate further, our results for co-residence show no erosion in the tradition 
of parents living with adult sons and these results alone are consistent with sex ratios being 
biased against girls. We find some weak but inconclusive (imprecise) evidence of 
adjustment post reform in the distance between daughters’ natal and marital homes. While 
this may indicate that daughters want to move closer to natal property once they acquire 
rights over it, it may have little impact on parents’ incentives if what parents need is effort 
(labour) on the property (often land), which is historically provided by co-resident sons. In 
other words, co-residence with sons may dominate parental incentives. Another 
explanation that would reconcile the result pertaining to married daughters potentially 
living closer with the result that parents continue to be averse to giving birth to (more than 
one) daughter(s) is that the compliers driving these two results may be different. In other 
words, families who commit female foeticide are different than those whose daughters 
marry closer to the natal home.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper shows that legislation that gives women equal rights to inheritance of ancestral 
property intensifies son preference in fertility. The evidence is stark, showing large 
increases in parents’ proclivity to commit sex-selective abortion in order to manipulate the 
sex composition of their births in favour of sons. In fact, we find that parents also adjusted 
                                               
50 We use the kilometer distance between the household sampled and each married woman’s 
marital home. This measure includes female household heads, whose distance from their natal 
home is defined as zero for household heads who were born in their current home.  
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the sex composition of their births in other ways: the reform was associated with an 
increase in girl relative to boy infant mortality and an increase in the tendency for families 
without a son (or their desired number of sons) to continue fertility. This is corroborated 
by evidence on increased reported son preference (i.e. stated desired share of sons among 
births) post reform.  
Our findings demonstrate the challenges faced by legal reform. They suggest that 
support for institutionalizing women’s economic rights was not widespread in India. 
Pervasive support (among men) has been argued to emerge as the returns to human capital 
investment rise (Doepke and Tertilt 2009). While a full analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we observe that average returns to human capital have been rising in India since the 
1990s, and that women’s education has converged towards that of men. However, there 
remain barriers to women realizing returns to education on the labour market (Field et al. 
2016). Moreover, we provide evidence that the convention that sons provide old-age 
security has not changed and there is no systematically provided state pension.  
In Europe and America, the legislation of economic rights for women followed the 
implementation of women’s suffrage. In India, women and men have had equal voting 
rights since India gained independence from British rule in 1947, but legislation of rights 
for women has proceeded only slowly since then.51 The early amendments to the Hindu 
Succession Act that we analyse in this paper were favoured by women legislators in seats 
reserved for lower castes, with women legislators from higher castes having no discernible 
impact on women-friendly laws (Clots-Figueras, 2011). It may be that consistent 
monitoring of implementation of legal change requires a larger share of women in 
government than currently occupy these positions in India (Brulé 2017). During 1980-
2007, for instance, 59% of women in contrast with 66% of men turned out to vote, but 
only 4.4% of electoral candidates for state legislative assemblies were women, and women 
comprised only 5.5% of state legislatures (Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer forthcoming). 
   
                                               
51 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 was among the first pro-female legislative reforms, followed 
by The Prevention of Sati (widow burning) Act of 1987 and the National Commission for Women 
Act 1990. The federal Inheritance Rights Reform and the Protection of Women Domestic Violence 
Act were passed as recently as 2005, and the Child Marriage Act was passed in 2006. 
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Figure 1: The Five Reforming States (in green) and rest of India (in blue) 
Notes: The southern state of Andhra Pradesh split into two states - Andhra Pradesh and Telengana - in 
2014. For the purposes of our analysis, these two are considered together as the undivided state of 
Andhra Pradesh that reformed in 1986. 
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Figure 2a: Growth in availability of ultrasound machines (domestic)  
Notes: The bars in the bottom graph plot the number of ultrasound machines produced domestically in 
India. Data Source: George (2006). Drawn from Anukriti et al. (2016). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: Growth in availability of ultrasound machines (imported) 
Notes: (1) The solid line in the top graph plots the fraction of births in a year for which the mother reports getting 
an ultrasound test at some point during the pregnancy (the denominator equals the number of births with a non-
missing response on ultrasound use). The relevant question was not asked in NFHS-1 but in NFHS-2 and NFHS-3, 
data on ultrasound use was collected for births since January 1995 and January 2001, respectively. The years 1995 
and 2000 have been dropped due to extremely small sample sizes. (2) The dashed line in the top graph plots the 
number of ultrasound scanners imported at the national level, the first records of which appear in the import data 
in 1987; indeed, there was no category coding these scanners before then. Source: Mahal et al. (2006). Drawn from 
Anukriti et al. (2016). 
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Figure 3: Trends in Reported Son Preference over time  
Notes: NFHS data. Son preference in fertility reported by the mother. Time variation created by assuming that 
preferences as stated at any age of interview are shaped at age 20. See the text for a discussion.  
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Figure 4: Trends in proportion of females at birth (5-year moving averages) 
 Notes: These plots are derived from Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010). Panel A shows the evolution of percent female among 
first births over time. Panel B plots the trend in percentage of births that are female for second births separately for 
families with firstborn son and firstborn daughter. In both cases, the y-axis shows the 5-year moving average of percentage 
of births that are female. Panel A show that, despite ultrasound availability, the sex ratio of first births has remained 
normal.  
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 1: Sex Ratios at Birth 
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female       
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -4.26**       -4.22**       -4.19**       -4.28**       -5.60*** 
                    (1.54)        (1.54)        (1.54)        (1.57)        (1.64)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -3.77**       -3.60**       -3.59**       -3.54**       -4.58**  
                    (1.51)        (1.46)        (1.46)        (1.44)        (1.91)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    No 
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   305741        301831        301831        301831        305741    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS 
data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 
if birth is female and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100. “First-born is girl” is a dummy that equals 1 if the first-born child in the 
family is a girl, and zero otherwise. “Reform” is a dummy that equals 1 if the child is born after the reform in the reforming state 
and zero if they are born before the reform or in a non-reforming state. The reforming states are Kerala (1976), Andhra Pradesh 
(1986), Tamil Nadu (1989), Karnataka (1994) and Maharashtra (1994). “p2” and “p3” are dummy variables that capture the early 
(1985-94) and later (1995-2004) phases of ultrasound availability. Control variables include household wealth, parental 
education, urban dummy, religion dummies, high-caste dummy and age group categories of mother. With mother fixed effects, 
most of these controls are not identified since they do not vary within household, hence are not included. All necessary level and 
double-interaction terms are included but not reported (see Appendix Table A1 instead). 
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Table 2: Sex Ratios at Birth: Robustness Checks         
                (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                Child is female 
 State Women's Commission Excluding 
Maharashtra 
and Karnataka 
Only 
Southern 
States 
completed fertility 
                       mother 
age>=35 
actual 
fert.>=desi
red fert. 
First-born is girl*Reform*p2 -4.19** -4.19**  -3.98**    -3.11** -2.97* 
                (1.54) (1.54)  (1.67)    (1.39)  (1.60) 
First-born is girl*Reform*p3 -3.59** -3.49**  -2.18    -2.93  -1.86 
                (1.46) (1.44)  (1.37)    (2.32)  (1.38) 
State Commission 0.40 0.52         
 (0.50) (0.60)         
First-born is girl*State Commission*p2  0.37         
                 (1.47)         
First-born is girl*State Commission*p3  -         
                          
First-born girl*Reform*post      -6.97**    
                     (1.99)     
Controls        Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Child year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State linear trends Yes Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
State-year of birth fixed effects  No No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
N               301831 301831  268594  73298  166561  233633 
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS data, is restricted 
to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. We control for state-specific linear trends in Columns 1 and 2 since the relevant 
control variable (state commission) is not identified with state-year fixed effects. For details on sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. All 
necessary level and double-interaction terms are included but not reported. Standard errors for Column 4 are adjusted using wild t-bootstrapping 
following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008). 
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Table 3: Reported Son Preference 
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)    
                Son Preference    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2       0.01**        0.01**        0.01**        0.01*** 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3       0.01*         0.01*         0.01**        0.01**  
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Mother year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes    
N                   412039        406775        406775        406775    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This 
table uses NFHS data and all births. The dependent variable is the ratio of desired/ideal number of sons over 
desired/ideal number of total children as reported by the mother. This being measured only at the time of survey, 
we construct a continuous measure of reported son preference based the age of the mother at the time of survey. 
We assume that son preferences at age 20 determine fertility (and foeticide) choices (see discussion in text). Thus, 
women aged 20 in 1998 define son preferences in 1998, while women aged 40 in 1998 defined son preferences in 
1978 (since they were 20 years old in 1978). Since by construction, the dependent variable does not vary within 
mother, we do not present results from a specification with mother fixed effects for reported son preference. For 
details on other variables, see notes for Table 1. All necessary level and double-interaction terms are included but 
not reported (see Appendix Table A8 instead). 
 
Table 4: Female Infant Mortality 
     
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                  Child dies before turning 1 year old 
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -1.59***      -1.44**       -1.43**       -1.37**       -3.47*** 
                    (0.51)        (0.58)        (0.57)        (0.57)        (1.01)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -1.24**       -1.15**       -1.18**       -1.19**       -3.61**  
                    (0.57)        (0.54)        (0.52)        (0.52)        (1.68)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2*female       3.17***       3.50***       3.47***       3.39***       6.31*** 
                    (0.83)        (0.84)        (0.83)        (0.83)        (2.20)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3*female       2.29***       2.57***       2.59***       2.55***       6.31*** 
                    (0.74)        (0.69)        (0.68)        (0.69)        (2.15)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes    No 
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    No 
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   305741        301831        301831        301831        301831    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS 
data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent variable captures whether the child 
died on or before their first birthday, multiplied by 100. "female" is a dummy that captures if the index child is a girl. For details on 
sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. All necessary level and double-interaction terms are included but not reported (see 
Appendix Table A9 instead). 
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Table 5: Fertility      
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Has younger sibling    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2 3.30 2.52 2.59 2.45 3.28 
                (3.90) (3.79) (3.78) (3.84) (4.68) 
First-born is girl*Reform*p3       8.56***       8.10***       8.19***       7.90***       12.33*** 
                (1.96) (2.00) (1.98) (2.07) (2.94) 
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    No 
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   305741        301831        301831        301831        305741    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS 
data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent variable captures whether the 
child has younger brothers or sisters, multiplied by 100. For details on sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. All necessary 
level and double-interaction terms are included but not reported (see Appendix Table A10 instead). 
 
Table 6. Co-residence of Parents and Adult Sons 
   
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)    
                Parent Resides with Adult Son 
Exposure to reform      -0.01         -0.01         -0.01         -0.02    
     (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)        (0.01)    
Controls                Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes    
Married sons only No Yes Yes Yes 
N      16392         13820         13820          13820    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This 
table uses REDS data, includes all adult (aged 18 or older) sons born before 2005 in families with at least one living 
parent. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not a given son is residing with a parent. 
“Exposure to reform” is a dummy variable which equals 1 if there is a sister in the given son’s generation who was 
14 years or less at the time of reform in the reforming state and zero otherwise. Our measure includes two 
generations of sons: first, the household head and siblings, and second, the household head’s children. Control 
variables include household size, land ownership, and education. Mother fixed effects are not included in this table 
because of limited within-mother variation in births spanning treatment periods. 
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Table 7: Patrilocality     
                       (1)           (2)           (3)    
                Marital & Natal Homes<10km Apart    
Exposure to reform       0.02          0.03*         0.00    
                    (0.02)        (0.02)        (0.02)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes    
Year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes    
N                    43035         37283         37283    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. This table uses REDS data, and includes all married women born before 2005. The 
dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not there are at most 10 km between a 
given woman’s natal and marital homes. “Exposure to reform” is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
given woman was 14 years or younger at the time of reform in the reforming states and zero 
otherwise. Control variables include household wealth, parental education, religion dummies, 
high-caste dummy and age group categories of the mother. Mother fixed effects are not 
included in this table because of limited within-mother variation in births spanning treatment 
periods. 
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Table 8: Test of balance in samples by first-born sex   
 first-born is boy first-born is girl Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rural 0.64 0.64 -0.00 
 (0.48) (0.48) [0.00] 
Hindu 0.76 0.76 -0.00 
 (0.43) (0.42) [0.00] 
Muslim 0.11 0.11 -0.00 
 (0.31) (0.31) [0.00] 
High caste Hindu 0.38 0.37 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.48) [0.00] 
Parental education    
Mother has secondary or higher education 0.12 0.12 0.00 
 (0.32) (0.32) [0.00] 
Father has secondary or higher education 0.21 0.21 0.00 
 (0.41) (0.41) [0.00] 
Mother's birth cohort    
1942-1960 0.03 0.03 0.00 
 (0.18) (0.18) [0.00] 
1954-1979 0.88 0.88 0.00 
 (0.33) (0.33) [0.00] 
1980-1987 0.09 0.09 -0.00 
 (0.28) (0.29) [0.00] 
Mother's age at birth    
12-15 0.11 0.10 0.00 
 (0.31) (0.31) [0.00] 
16-18 0.32 0.32 0.00 
 (0.47) (0.46) [0.00] 
19-24 0.47 0.47 -0.00 
 (0.50) (0.50) [0.00] 
25-30 0.09 0.09 -0.00 
 (0.29) (0.29) [0.00] 
31-49 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.11) (0.11) [0.00] 
Top 20% by wealth 0.24 0.24 0.00 
 (0.43) (0.43) [0.00] 
N (1st births) 87760 81968 169728 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Standard errors are in brackets. This 
table uses NFHS data. 
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Online Appendix A: Additional Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Sex Ratios at Birth: Full Specification     
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)           (6)    
                Child is female    
First-born is girl       0.88**        0.94**        0.80*         0.80*         0.84*   - 
                    (0.42)        (0.42)        (0.42)        (0.42)        (0.42)     
First-born is girl*p2      -1.46**      -1.50***      -1.42**       -1.42**       -1.47***      -3.33*** 
                    (0.53)        (0.52)        (0.52)        (0.52)        (0.52)        (0.90)    
First-born is girl*p3      -4.13***      -4.19***      -4.08***      -4.09***      -4.19***      -9.17*** 
                    (0.82)        (0.83)        (0.83)        (0.83)        (0.83)        (1.38)    
Reform               0.46**       -0.76**       -0.96**       -3.11*** -       1.12    
                    (0.22)        (0.35)        (0.37)        (0.59)         (0.89)    
Reform*p2             0.08          0.69          0.90*         2.65*** -      -2.08*** 
                    (0.26)        (0.47)        (0.50)        (0.55)         (0.74)    
Reform*p3             -0.11          0.40          0.66          2.48*** -      -3.42    
                    (0.44)        (0.48)        (0.54)        (0.81)         (2.15)    
First-born is girl*Reform       4.93***       4.88***       4.73***       4.71***       4.74***       6.72*** 
                    (0.42)        (0.43)        (0.43)        (0.43)        (0.42)        (0.80)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -4.30***       -4.26**       -4.22**       -4.19**       -4.28**       -5.60*** 
                    (1.51)        (1.54)        (1.54)        (1.54)        (1.57)        (1.64)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -3.83**       -3.77**       -3.60**       -3.59**       -3.54**       -4.58**  
     (1.50)        (1.51)        (1.46)        (1.46)        (1.44)        (1.91)    
p2       0.57**         
     (0.21)         
p3       0.99***         
     (0.33)         
Constant 47.76***      
     (0.22)         
Controls        No No Yes Yes Yes No 
State fixed effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Child year of birth fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No No No Yes No Yes 
State-year of birth fixed effects  No No No No Yes No 
Mother fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
N               305741     305741        301831        301831        301831        305741    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS data, 
is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. For details on sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. In 
column 5, the level  effect of the reform as well as its interactions with the p2 (early ultrasound) and p3 (late ultrasound) dummies are 
no longer identified after the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed effects. In column 6, girl1 is no longer identified after the inclusion of 
mother fixed effects. In all the columns, the coefficient on first-born is girl*reform is likely to capture a "Kerala effect", since Kerala was 
the only state to reform pre-ultrasound.  
  
43 
 
Table A2a: Sex Ratios at Birth: Including up to Third Births  
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female 
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -1.85*        -1.88*        -1.86*        -1.82*         -2.55    
                    (1.06)        (1.07)        (1.07)        (1.07)        (1.51)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -1.86         -1.83         -1.84         -1.80         -0.22    
                    (1.40)        (1.39)        (1.38)        (1.37)        (1.68)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects         No            No            No            No           Yes    
N                  393518        388505        388505        388505        393518    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
This table uses NFHS data, is restricted to up to third births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. For details 
on sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. 
      
Table A2b: Sex Ratios at Birth: Including up to Fourth Births   
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -1.65*   -1.63 -1.62 -1.63 -1.51 
                (0.95) (0.99) (0.99) (0.98) (1.32) 
First-born is girl*Reform*p3 -1.41 -1.36 -1.37 -1.37 2.11 
                (1.22) (1.21) (1.21) (1.20) (1.38) 
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects         No            No            No            No           Yes    
N               442923 437274 437274 437274 442923 
Notes: Same as above. Sample restricted up to fourth births.   
      
Table A2c: Sex ratio at Birth: First Births     
 Child is female    
Reform 0.08  
 (0.20)  
Reform*p2 0.50  
 (0.37)  
Reform*p3 0.84  
 (0.53)  
p2 0.46*  
 (0.24)  
p3 0.73**  
 (0.30)  
Constant 47.81***  
 (0.20)  
N 169728  
Notes: Same as above. Sample restricted first births only.   
      
 
Table A3: Sex Ratios at Birth: Hindu-landed, only reform  
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                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)    
                Child is female    
First-born is girl      -0.46         -0.51         -0.51         -0.50    
                    (0.75)        (0.76)        (0.76)        (0.76)    
Reform      -1.23         -1.16         -1.77    - 
                    (1.16)        (1.20)        (1.48)     
First-born is girl*Reform       1.18          1.17          1.17          1.15    
                    (2.60)        (2.53)        (2.53)        (2.59)    
Hindu              -0.13         -0.52         -0.52         -0.46    
                    (0.41)        (0.53)        (0.53)        (0.53)    
First-born is girl*Hindu      -1.07         -1.22         -1.21         -1.27    
                    (0.74)        (0.77)        (0.77)        (0.76)    
Reform*Hindu       1.22          1.14          1.08          0.95    
                    (0.83)        (0.85)        (0.83)        (0.84)    
First-born is girl*Reform*Hindu       0.16          0.33          0.32          0.37    
                    (1.74)        (1.72)        (1.72)        (1.77)    
Land               -0.11         -0.23         -0.20         -0.21    
                    (0.74)        (0.77)        (0.77)        (0.78)    
First-born is girl*Land       0.04          0.06          0.05          0.13    
                    (1.36)        (1.38)        (1.38)        (1.42)    
Reform*Land      -2.17         -2.18         -2.25         -2.08    
                    (1.55)        (1.63)        (1.62)        (1.67)    
First-born is girl* Reform*Land       1.10          1.10          1.14          0.88    
                    (2.44)        (2.39)        (2.37)        (2.48)    
Hindu*Land       0.20          0.14          0.14          0.15    
                    (0.73)        (0.74)        (0.74)        (0.75)    
First-born is girl*Hindu*Land       0.95          1.06          1.04          1.01    
                    (1.46)        (1.47)        (1.47)        (1.51)    
Reform*Hindu*Land       2.40          2.47          2.50          2.28    
                    (1.51)        (1.58)        (1.58)        (1.66)    
First-born is girl*Reform*Hindu*Land      -3.64*        -3.91**       -3.92**       -3.75*   
                    (1.85)        (1.81)        (1.79)        (1.90)    
     
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Cohort fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No    
State-year fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes    
N                   267982        264714        264714        264714    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table 
uses NFHS data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that equals 1 if birth is female and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100. “First-born is girl” is a dummy that equals 
1 if the first-born child in the family is a girl, and zero otherwise. “Reform” is a dummy that equals 1 if the child is born 
after the reform in the reforming state and zero if they are born before the reform or in a non-reforming state. The 
reforming states are Kerala (1976), Andhra Pradesh (1986), Tamil Nadu (1989), Karnataka (1994) and Maharashtra 
(1994). "Hindu" is a dummy that equals 1 if the household religion is Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain and zero otherwise. 
"Land" is a dummy that equals 1 if the household own land and zero otherwise. Control variables include household 
wealth, parental education, urban dummy, high-caste dummy and age group categories of mother. In column 4, the 
level effect of the reform is no longer identified after the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed effects. 
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Table A4a: Sex Ratios at Birth: Using Alternative dataset REDS 2006   
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female    
First-born is girl*Reform*post      -7.89**       -7.63*       -6.94        -6.94        -8.30*   
                    (3.32)        (3.77)        (4.26)        (4.27)        (4.75)    
Controls        No         No           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects  No        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Child year of birth fixed effects No        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends  No         No            No           Yes            No    
State-year of birth fixed effects  No         No            No            No           Yes    
N                    11715         11715         10672         10672         10672    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table 
uses REDS data, and is restricted up to second births. Due to smaller number of observations in REDS 2006 compared 
to NFHS, we combine the two ultrasound periods into a single “Post” dummy variable that captures the full ultrasound 
period 1985-2004. Control variables include household wealth, parental education, religion dummies, high-caste 
dummy and age group categories of mother. For details on the rest of variables, see notes for Table 1. Mother fixed 
effects are not included in this table because of limited within-mother variation in births spanning treatment periods. 
 
Table A4b: Sex Ratios at Birth: Robustness Checks: Using Alternative dataset REDS 2006  
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)     
                Child is female     
 State Women's 
Commission 
Excluding 
Maharashtra 
and 
Karnataka 
Only 
Southern 
States 
completed 
fertility 
 
                    mother 
age>=35 
 
First-born is girl*Reform*post      -7.64*       -6.95       -13.92***       -12.39      -11.43**   
                    (3.82)        (4.28)        (3.38)        (7.02)    (4.40)  
State Commission 1.29 0.87     
 (1.97) (2.11)     
Controls        No Yes Yes Yes Yes  
State fixed effects  Yes Yes No No Yes  
Child year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
State linear trends Yes Yes No No Yes  
Female*state linear trends No No No No No  
State-year of birth fixed effects  No No Yes Yes No  
N               11715 10672 8973 3686 8320  
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table 
uses REDS data. Due to smaller number of observations in REDS 2006 compared to NFHS, we combine the two 
ultrasound periods into a single “Post” dummy variable that captures the full ultrasound period 1985-2004. We control 
for state-specific linear trends in Columns 1 and 2 since the relevant control variable (state commission) is not identified 
with state-year fixed effects. For details on the sample and rest of variables, see notes for Tables 1 and 2.  We cannot 
replicate the final column (6) of Table 2 as REDS does not provide information on mother's ideal number of children. 
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Table A4c: Sex Ratios at Birth for Hindu Landowning Families: Using Alternative dataset REDS 2006 
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female 
First-born is girl*Reform*post     -10.41***     -9.30**       -8.61*       -8.81*      -12.94** 
                    (3.13)        (3.70)        (4.21)        (4.24)        (4.56)    
Controls        No         No           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects  No        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Child year of birth fixed effects No        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends  No         No            No           Yes            No    
State-year of birth fixed effects  No         No            No            No           Yes    
N                    10851         10851          9869          9869           9869    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table 
uses REDS data for families who are subject to Hindu law (Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists) with landowning 
patriarchs (the grandparents of the generation we observe here), and is restricted up to second births. Due to smaller 
number of observations in REDS 2006 compared to NFHS, we combine the two ultrasound periods into a single “Post” 
dummy variable that captures the full ultrasound period 1985-2004. Control variables include household wealth, 
parental education, religion dummies, high-caste dummy and age group categories of mother. For details on the rest of 
variables, see notes for Table 1.  
 
Table A5: Sex Ratios at Birth: Excluding northern states    
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -5.17***      -5.09***      -5.06***      -5.09***      -5.71*** 
                    (1.58)        (1.57)        (1.58)        (1.62)        (1.84)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -5.70***      -5.46***      -5.46***      -5.39***      -5.48**  
                    (1.54)        (1.50)        (1.49)        (1.48)        (2.06)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
Cohort fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   210620        207761        207761        207761        210620    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This 
table uses NFHS data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that equals 1 if birth is female and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100. “First-born is girl” is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the first-born child in the family is a girl, and zero otherwise. “Reform” is a dummy that equals 
1 if the child is born after the reform in the reforming state and zero if they are born before the reform or in a non-
reforming state. The reforming states are Kerala (1976), Andhra Pradesh (1986), Tamil Nadu (1989), Karnataka (1994) 
and Maharashtra (1994). “p2” and “p3” are dummy variables that capture the early (1985-94) and later (1995-2004) 
phases of ultrasound availability. Control variables include household wealth, parental education, urban dummy, 
religion dummies, high-caste dummy and age group categories of mother. With mother fixed effects, most of these 
controls are not identified since they do not vary within household, hence are not included. All necessary level and 
double-interaction terms are included but not reported. Northern states are Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, New Delhi, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, UP. 
 
Table A6: Sex Ratios at Birth: Excluding eastern states 
                         (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Child is female    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -3.87**      -3.76**      -3.73**      -3.78**      -5.49** 
                    (1.67)        (1.66)        (1.66)        (1.69)        (1.92)    
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First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -2.90      -2.72      -2.69      -2.57      -4.10  
                    (1.76)        (1.71)        (1.70)        (1.66)        (2.43)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    No 
Cohort fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   212613        210336        210336        210336        212613    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This 
table uses NFHS data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that equals 1 if birth is female and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100. “First-born is girl” is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the first-born child in the family is a girl, and zero otherwise. “Reform” is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the child is born after the reform in the reforming state and zero if they are born before the reform or 
in a non-reforming state. The reforming states are Kerala (1976), Andhra Pradesh (1986), Tamil Nadu (1989), 
Karnataka (1994) and Maharashtra (1994). “p2” and “p3” are dummy variables that capture the early (1985-94) 
and later (1995-2004) phases of ultrasound availability. Control variables include household wealth, parental 
education, urban dummy, religion dummies, high-caste dummy and age group categories of mother. With mother 
fixed effects, most of these controls are not identified since they do not vary within household, hence are not 
included. All necessary level and double-interaction terms are included but not reported. Eastern states are 
Assam, Bihar, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Sikkim, West Bengal, Tripura. 
 
Table A7: Proportion of Female Births: Mother Exposure to Reform 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Girls/total children 
Mother exposure      -0.01***      -0.01***      -0.01    
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.01)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes    
Mother year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes    
N                   490833        484501        484501    
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in 
parentheses. This table uses NFHS data and all births. The dependent variable is the total number of girls 
born to the mother divided by the total number of children born to her (G/G+B). `Reform' is a dummy 
that equals 1 if the mother is 14 years or less at the time of reform in the reforming state and zero 
otherwise. Control variables include household wealth, parental education, urban dummy, religion 
dummies and high-caste dummy.  
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Table A8: Reported Son Preference: Full Specification   
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)    
                Son Preference    
First-born is girl      -0.02***      -0.02***      -0.02***      -0.02*** 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
First-born is girl*p2       0.00         -0.00         -0.00         -0.00    
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
First-born is girl*p3       0.00          0.00          0.00          0.00    
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
Reform               -0.00         -0.00         -0.00    - 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)     
Reform*p2            -0.00         -0.00         -0.00    - 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)     
Reform*p3            -0.01**       -0.01*        -0.00    - 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)     
First-born is girl*Reform      -0.01         -0.01*        -0.01**       -0.01*** 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2       0.01**        0.01**        0.01**        0.01*** 
                    (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3       0.01*         0.01*         0.01**        0.01**  
     (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)        (0.00)    
                    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Mother year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes    
N                   412039        406775        406775        406775    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This 
table uses NFHS data and all births. For details on sample and variables, see notes for Table 3. In column 4, the 
level  effect of the reform as well as its interaction with the p2 (early ultrasound) and p3 (late ultrasound) dummies 
are no longer identified after the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed effects. 
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Table A9: Female Infant Mortality: Full Specification     
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                  Child dies before turning 1 year old 
First-born is girl      -2.63***      -1.76***      -1.78***      -1.85*** - 
                    (0.36)        (0.35)        (0.35)        (0.35)     
First-born is girl*p2       0.95*         0.77          0.79          0.82          0.82    
                    (0.52)        (0.53)        (0.52)        (0.52)        (1.13)    
First-born is girl*p3       0.31         -0.06          0.03          0.10          0.49    
                    (0.42)        (0.45)        (0.42)        (0.42)        (1.23)    
Reform               -1.63***      -1.45***      -0.31    -      -1.19    
                    (0.25)        (0.27)        (0.36)         (0.89)    
Reform*p2             0.88**        0.93**        0.20    -       0.14    
                    (0.33)        (0.35)        (0.23)         (0.69)    
Reform*p3             1.43**        1.72**        1.21*   -       0.48    
                    (0.67)        (0.68)        (0.68)         (1.71)    
First-born is girl*Reform       2.70***       2.42***       2.41***       2.37***       4.85*** 
                    (0.35)        (0.33)        (0.33)        (0.35)        (0.84)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2      -1.59***      -1.44**       -1.43**       -1.37**       -3.47*** 
                    (0.51)        (0.58)        (0.57)        (0.57)        (1.01)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3      -1.24**       -1.15**       -1.18**       -1.19**       -3.61**  
                    (0.57)        (0.54)        (0.52)        (0.52)        (1.68)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2*female       3.17***       3.50***       3.47***       3.39***       6.31*** 
                    (0.83)        (0.84)        (0.83)        (0.83)        (2.20)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3*female       2.29***       2.57***       2.59***       2.55***       6.31*** 
                    (0.74)        (0.69)        (0.68)        (0.69)        (2.15)    
Reform*female         0.43**        0.43**        0.42**        0.40*         1.13**  
                    (0.20)        (0.20)        (0.20)        (0.19)        (0.49)    
First-born is girl*female       2.70***       2.60***       2.61***       2.62***       4.68*** 
                    (0.51)        (0.51)        (0.51)        (0.52)        (1.13)    
First-born is girl*p2*female      -1.78**       -1.73**       -1.73**       -1.70**       -1.14    
                    (0.68)        (0.71)        (0.71)        (0.71)        (1.53)    
First-born is girl*p3*female      -0.84*        -0.84*        -0.88**       -0.87**       -1.06    
                    (0.43)        (0.44)        (0.42)        (0.42)        (1.24)    
First-born is girl*Reform*female      -3.03***      -3.17***      -3.15***      -3.10***      -6.47*** 
                    (0.53)        (0.54)        (0.53)        (0.52)        (0.95)    
Reform*p2*female      -0.24         -0.31         -0.30         -0.30         -0.08    
                    (0.33)        (0.34)        (0.34)        (0.34)        (0.84)    
Reform*p3*female       0.19          0.17          0.18          0.16         -0.30    
                    (0.49)        (0.47)        (0.47)        (0.46)        (1.36)    
p2*female             0.62***       0.60***       0.60***       0.59***       0.26    
                    (0.20)        (0.20)        (0.20)        (0.20)        (0.63)    
p3*female             0.47*         0.40          0.40          0.41          0.22    
                    (0.25)        (0.26)        (0.25)        (0.26)        (0.70)    
female               -1.90***      -1.85***      -1.85***      -1.84***      -3.91*** 
                    (0.21)        (0.21)        (0.20)        (0.20)        (0.70)    
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    No 
50 
 
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   305741        301831        301831        301831        301831    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS 
data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent variable captures whether the child 
died on or before their first birthday, multiplied by 100. "female" is a dummy that captures if the index child is a girl. For details on 
sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. In column 4, the level  effect of the reform as well as its interactions with the p2 (early 
ultrasound) and p3 (late ultrasound) dummies are no longer identified after the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed effects. In 
column 5, girl1 is no longer identified after the inclusion of mother fixed effects. 
 
Table A10: Fertility: Full Specification     
                       (1)           (2)           (3)           (4)           (5)    
                Has younger sibling    
First-born is girl      -2.08***      -0.02          0.00         -0.02    - 
                    (0.57)        (0.49)        (0.49)        (0.49)     
First-born is girl*p2      -2.28***      -2.23***      -2.27***      -2.25***      -3.24*** 
                    (0.54)        (0.55)        (0.55)        (0.54)        (0.98)    
First-born is girl*p3      -2.93***      -2.86***      -2.91***      -2.88***     -10.81*** 
                    (0.56)        (0.56)        (0.56)        (0.55)        (1.55)    
Reform                7.89***       5.70***       5.47*** -       9.19*** 
                    (0.75)        (0.69)        (1.09)         (1.33)    
Reform*p2            -7.66***      -5.75***      -5.38*** -      -6.95*** 
                    (0.82)        (0.69)        (0.77)         (1.76)    
Reform*p3            -5.95***      -3.56**       -2.88    -      -8.11**  
                    (1.51)        (1.55)        (2.00)         (3.00)    
First-born is girl*Reform     -16.11***     -15.51***     -15.57***     -15.34***     -14.34*** 
                    (0.57)        (0.62)        (0.63)        (0.62)        (1.08)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p2       3.30          2.52          2.59          2.45          3.28    
                    (3.90)        (3.79)        (3.78)        (3.84)        (4.68)    
First-born is girl*Reform*p3       8.56***       8.10***       8.19***       7.90***      12.33*** 
     (1.96)        (2.00)        (1.98)        (2.07)        (2.94)    
                     
Controls                No           Yes           Yes           Yes            No    
State fixed effects         Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
Child year of birth fixed effects        Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes    
State linear trends          No            No           Yes            No           Yes    
State-year of birth fixed effects          No            No            No           Yes            No    
Mother fixed effects No No No No Yes 
N                   305741        301831        301831        301831        305741    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at state-level, are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table uses NFHS 
data, is restricted to up to second births, with birth cohorts from 1972 to 2004. The dependent variable captures whether the 
child has younger brothers or sisters, multiplied by 100. For details on sample and variables, see notes for Table 1. In column 4, 
the level  effect of the reform as well as its interactions with the p2 (early ultrasound) and p3 (late ultrasound) dummies are no 
longer identified after the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed effects. In column 5, girl1 is no longer identified after the inclusion 
of mother fixed effects 
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Table A11: Patrilocality: Alternative distance measure 
   (1) (2) (3) 
 
Marital & Natal Homes <20km Apart 
Exposure to Reform 0.03 0.03* -0.00 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Controls                No    Yes Yes 
State fixed effects         Yes    Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects        Yes    Yes Yes 
State linear trends          No    No Yes 
N 43035 37283 37283 
Notes: This table uses REDS data. See further notes in Table 7. 
 
 
Table A12: Means of Outcome Variables  
outcome variable used to measure mean 
NFHS   
sex ratio probability of female birth (%) 48.07 
son preference ideal no. of boys/ideal no. of children 0.57 
infant girl mortality child dies before first birthday (%) 7.3 
infant boy mortality child dies before first birthday (%) 7.7 
fertility (up to birth order 2) child has younger siblings (%) 73.2 
   
REDS   
co-residence Probability that adult married son co-resides with parent 0.24 
marriage distance probability that daughter's marital and natal homes<10km apart 0.19 
 
Table A13: Pre-Reform Balance Test in Reforming and Non-reforming States, 1970-75 
 Non-Reform Reform Difference 
 (1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Child is female 47.82 49.91 -2.09 
 (49.96) (50.01) [1.73] 
Son preference [ideal b/(b+g)] 0.60 0.56 0.04** 
 (0.14) (0.14) [0.01] 
First born in family is a boy 0.15 0.14 0.01 
 (0.35) (0.34) [0.01] 
Mother has secondary or higher education 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.16) [0.01] 
Father has secondary or higher education 0.11 0.09 0.02 
 (0.32) (0.29) [0.02] 
Urban 0.30 0.32 -0.02 
 (0.46) (0.47) [0.04] 
Hindu 0.75 0.78 -0.03 
 (0.43) (0.41) [0.07] 
Richest wealth quintile 0.22 0.24 -0.02 
 (0.42) (0.43) [0.04] 
High caste 0.56 0.63 -0.07 
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 (0.50) (0.48) [0.05] 
N 9381 2839 12220 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Standard errors, clustered at the state level, are in 
brackets. This table uses NFHS data. 
    
Table A14: Test of balance in various time periods, by firstborn sex 
 1973-1984  1985-1994  1995-2005  All years 
 FB FG  FB FG  FB FG  FB-FG 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
Rural 0.68 0.68  0.64 0.65  0.59 0.58  -0.0004 
Hindu 0.78 0.78  0.76 0.76  0.73 0.74  -0.0009 
Muslim 0.11 0.11  0.12 0.12  0.13 0.13  -0.0001 
SC 0.14 0.14  0.15 0.16  0.16 0.17  -0.0030* 
ST 0.12 0.13  0.13 0.13  0.14 0.13  -0.0002 
Mother's Education           
No education 0.59 0.58  0.48 0.49  0.32 0.32  0.0020 
Incomplete secondary 0.35 0.36  0.40 0.40  0.48 0.48  -0.0020 
Secondary or higher 0.06 0.07  0.11 0.11  0.20 0.20  0.0000 
Father's Education           
No education 0.32 0.31  0.26 0.27  0.18 0.18  -0.0020 
Incomplete secondary 0.50 0.50  0.52 0.52  0.58 0.58  -0.0005 
Secondary or higher 0.18 0.19  0.22 0.21  0.24 0.24  0.0010 
Mother's birth cohort           
1942-1960 0.52 0.52  0.04 0.04  0.00 0.00  0.0020 
1961-1970 0.48 0.48  0.56 0.56  0.07 0.06  0.0010 
1971-1987 0.00 0.00  0.41 0.40  0.93 0.93  -0.0030 
Mother's age at birth           
12-15 0.14 0.13  0.11 0.11  0.05 0.06  0.0010 
16-18 0.35 0.35  0.32 0.32  0.26 0.26  0.0020 
19-24 0.44 0.44  0.47 0.48  0.53 0.53  -0.0020 
25-30 0.07 0.07  0.09 0.09  0.14 0.13  -0.0010 
31-49 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.02 0.02  0.0002 
Household wealth           
2nd quintile 0.15 0.14  0.16 0.17  0.16 0.16  0.0000 
3rd quintile 0.17 0.17  0.17 0.17  0.18 0.18  -0.0010 
4th quintile 0.21 0.21  0.23 0.22  0.23 0.23  0.0010 
Richest quintile 0.23 0.23  0.24 0.23  0.27 0.27  0.0030 
N (1st births) 26,064 23,905  41,430 38712  22108 21,074  173,293 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. This table is taken from Anukriti et al. (2016) and compares the socioeconomic 
characteristics of firstborn-boy (FB) and firstborn-girl (FG) families over three time periods in the NFHS sample. The sample 
is restricted to first births as only these are quasi-random. SC and ST denote Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
respectively. Column (7) shows the differences in sample means among FB and FG families for the entire sample. The larger 
sample size of FB relative to FG families reflects the fact that the sex ratio at birth is naturally above one.  
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Online Appendix B: Discussion on effect size for sex ratios 
The estimated effect sizes on the sex ratio are large, which may appear to stand at odds 
with the fact that son preference has, historically, been lower in the South. However, 
ultrasound usage in the South has overtaken usage in the North, as is shown below in 
Tables B3 and B4 respectively.  
Some of the reforming states (Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh) are among the top-
ranking states practicing sex-selective abortion in our representative NFHS data. For 
children of birth order two in families with a first born girl after the arrival of ultrasound in 
1985 (the treated group in our analysis), we calculated the number of sex-selective 
abortions for each state using this formula, following Sen (1990): 
No. of abortions = [no. of boys*(natural sex ratio)] – [no. of girls] 
where the natural sex ratio is 1.05 females per male, according to the World Health 
Organization. For this group, Maharashtra ranks 4th out of the 16 major states both for 
the number of abortions and for abortions as a proportion of total female population for 
that birth order (see Table B1 below). This is also consistent with evidence from census 
data which shows Maharashtra ranks 6th out of 16 states in the male-bias of the sex ratios 
in 1991 (Census of India, 1991). Andhra Pradesh, ranks 6th in number of abortions (and 7th 
in proportions), see Table B1 below.  
Table B1: State-wise Sex-selective Abortions in NFHS 
States boys girls 
no. of 
abortions rank 
proportion 
abortions rank 
Uttar Pradesh 3,262 2,793 632 1 0.23 3 
Punjab 1,043 735 360 2 0.49 1 
Madhya Pradesh 2,154 1,923 339 3 0.18 8 
Maharashtra 1,778 1,536 331 4 0.22 4 
Rajasthan 1,503 1,290 288 5 0.22 4 
Andhra Pradesh 1,310 1,151 225 6 0.20 7 
Gujarat 1,059 922 190 7 0.21 6 
Orissa 1,218 1,089 190 8 0.17 9 
Haryana 876 735 185 9 0.25 2 
Assam 919 846 119 10 0.14 10 
West Bengal 1,211 1,161 111 11 0.10 12 
Karnataka 1,264 1,219 108 12 0.09 13 
Tamil Nadu 1,211 1,168 104 13 0.09 13 
Himachal Pradesh 827 782 86 14 0.11 11 
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Kerala 800 817 23 15 0.03 15 
India 26,509 23,647 4187 - 0.18 - 
Source: Our calculations using NFHS 1992, 1998 and 2005. The sample here is children of birth order two in families 
with a first born girl after the arrival of ultrasound in 1985. Abortions are calculated using the above formula. 
The total proportion of sex-selective abortions for birth order two children conditional on 
a first born girl after the introduction of ultrasound in 1985 is presented in Table B2 below. 
For the reforming states the average is about 13%, which is larger than the estimated 
coefficient of about 4%. 
Table B2: Sex-selective Abortions in NFHS post ultrasound (after 1985) for birth order 2, firstborn girl 
families: Reforming versus Non-reforming States 
  Source: Our calculations using NFHS 1992, 1998 and 2005. 
 
 
   Table B3: Reported Ultrasound Use 
  NFHS 1998 NFHS 2005 Average 
Reforming states 0.08 0.24 0.16 
Non-reforming states 0.03 0.12 0.07 
       Source: Our calculations using NFHS 1998 and 2005. 
Another notable fact that we have not seen explicit in previous work and thus is worth 
highlighting is that the penetration of ultrasound access in rural areas was significantly 
greater in the reforming than in the non-reforming states, at 10% vs 4% (see Table B4 
below). In fact it was not far off the 14% rate of reported ultrasound use in urban areas of 
non-reforming states. This is relevant since households with ancestral land that were most 
effectively exposed to the inheritance reform were disproportionately resident in rural 
areas. 
Table B4: Reported Ultrasound usage: Reform vs non-reform, land vs non-land 
 total rural urban diff 
Reforming 0.16 0.10 0.23 0.13*** 
Non-reforming 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.10*** 
All states 0.09 0.05 0.16 0.11*** 
           Source: Our calculations using NFHS 1998 and 2005. 
  
 
Boys girls 
sex-selective 
abortions 
missing girls as % of 
live girls 
Reforming states 6363 5891 790 0.13 
Non-reforming states 20146 17756 3397 0.19 
All states 26509 23647 4187 0.18 
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Online Appendix C: Heterogeneous Effects of the Inheritance Reform by Religion 
and Land Ownership  
 
The reason we do not present in the paper a specification that leverages the greater 
exposure to Hindu land-owning households to the reform is that our main specification, 
Equation 1 in the paper, involves an interaction between inheritance reform (which 
changed incentives) and indicators for the availability of ultrasound scanners (which lower 
costs). There is no reason to believe that when ultrasound first became available in the 
country, it was similarly accessible by Hindu vs Muslim or land-owning vs landless 
households.  
For instance, Muslims are significantly more likely to live in urban areas (see Table C1 
below) and Table B4 presented above confirms that ultrasound usage was significantly 
greater in urban than in rural areas. Thus Muslims had greater and earlier access to 
ultrasound than Hindus but were less affected by the inheritance reform. Similarly landless 
households are more present in urban areas than rural (80% vs 35%) but land-owning 
households were more exposed to the reform. For these reasons, we did not have a prior 
that in a specification including the interaction with post-ultrasound, we will see that Hindu 
and land-owning households commit more sex selection. Using this interaction would not 
be clean as the different “treatments” can pull in different directions. 
Table C1: Percentage of Muslim population 
 
  Total Rural Urban Difference 
Reforming states 0.14 0.09 0.20 0.11*** 
All states 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.07*** 
     Source: Our calculations using NFHS 1992, 1998 and 2005. 
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Online Appendix D: Challenges of measuring ancestral land in NFHS and REDS 
NFHS: Land ownership is measured only at the time of survey. In addition, land 
ownership data in NFHS is highly aggregated: the question asked is whether or not the 
household owns land. It does not distinguish between ancestral and non-ancestral land, but 
this distinction matters because the reform only applies to inheritance in the former type of 
land. A family classified as “landowning” may not own any ancestral land (and hence 
would not be affected by the reform) while a family classified as “non-landowning” may be 
affected by the reform if the father (and hence his sons and daughters) in the family are 
eligible to inherit ancestral land but haven’t done so yet at the time of survey because their 
ancestor(s) is still alive. Both a) and b) would introduce measurement error  
REDS: Despite the very detailed, important measures of land ownership and inheritance 
that the REDS 2006 round provides, the combination of conceptual and practical 
measurement challenges make land inheritance a particularly difficult variable to analyse. 
The inheritance reform refers to ancestral land. According to Hindu Law, property 
inherited from one’s father, grandfather, or grandfather’s father constitutes ancestral 
property (Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, 15th Edition, pg. 289). So one potential measure 
is based on the greatest generational distance we are able to study using the REDS 2006 
round: land ownership by the grandfather of the generation we study here (the household 
head’s children). We are able to identify land ownership acreage whenever household heads 
report the amount of land (irrigated and unirrigated) owned by their parents (which, given 
traditional practice, is likely to be held entirely by the male patriarch).  
This is not a perfectly accurate measure of the stock of land inheritance available to a given 
child for two reasons. First: some amount of the grandfather’s land, potentially including 
the entirety of the property, may have already been partitioned amongst the family 
members who held it in common (known as coparceners) prior to a given child’s birth. 
Any partitioned property is subsequently considered privately held, and thus it is no longer 
deemed ancestral land available for inheritance.  
A second challenge to using this measure is practical: 35 percent of observations (4,100 of 
11,715 second birth order children in birth cohorts from 1972-2004) do not have data on 
the head’s parents’ land ownership. Out of the remaining observations, none record zero 
land ownership by the head’s parents. As a result, it is difficult to accurately identify which 
missing observations indicate zero land ownership versus unwillingness to report land 
ownership.  
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An alternative measure is based on the head’s reported acreage of inherited land. This is 
likely to be a more accurate measure of the stock of land inheritance available for a given 
child to inherit, but is also incomplete, as parents may decide to “gift” some or all of their 
share of inheritance to one or more of their (often male) children, to avoid the legal 
obligation to transfer ancestral land to other (often female) children (Roy 2015). 
There is also a practical challenge here: 49 percent of observations (5,724 of 11,715) have 
no data on father’s acreage of land inheritance. In this case, 1.4 percent of observations 
report zero acres of inherited land by the father (167 of 11,715), which makes it even more 
difficult to parse what amount of the missing observations indicate zero land inheritance 
versus unwillingness to report.  
A third option is to measure the acreage of land inheritance by the spouse of the 
household head (the mother of the children studied here). Here, problems of non-
reporting are most severe: we have data on only 2.8 percent of cases (331 of 11,715), with 
none of these observations reporting zero land inheritance by the given woman.  
 
 
 
 
 
